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SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ARKANSAS
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: DISTINGUISHING JUDICIAL
POWER AND LEGISLATIVE POWER
L. Scott Stafford*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Article IV, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution allocates the
powers of the government of the state of Arkansas among three departments: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.' Article IV, section 2 prohibits the exercise of any power belonging to one department
by a person, or collection of persons, belonging to another department.2
Article IV, section 1 vests the legislative power of the state in the General Assembly; 8 article VI, section 2 vests the executive power in the
* B.S.B.A., University of Arkansas at Fayetteville; J.D., Harvard Law School. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
1. ARK. CONST. art. IV, § 1 states: "The powers of the government of the State of Arkansas
shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of them to be confided to a separate body of
magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative to one, those which are executive to another, and
those which are judicial to another."
2. ARK. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2 states: "No person, or collection of persons, being one of these
departments, shall exercise any power belonging to either of the others, except in the instances
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted."
3. ARK. CONST. art. IV, § I states: "The legislative power of this State shall be vested in a
General Assembly, which shall consist of the Senate and House of Representatives." Art. V, § 1
was supplemented by amendment 7, which also vests the legislative power in the General Assembly, but reserves to the people the power of initiative and referendum.
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Governor;4 and article VII, section 1 vests the judicial power in the

Supreme Court and certain inferior courts.5
In theory, article IV decrees an absolute, tripartite separation of
the powers exercised by state government. But since the adoption of the

Arkansas Constitution in 1874, state government has grown in both
size and complexity, and this growth has, at times, tested the continued
practicality of an absolute separation of governmental powers. The tension between theory and practice is particularly apparent in the case of
administrative agencies. The General Assembly frequently grants both
enforcement and rulemaking powers to an administrative agency. The
Arkansas Supreme Court has never been overly concerned with the
blending of executive and legislative functions found in the statutory

charters of most administrative agencies. 6 In fact, it is often difficult to
discern from the court's opinions whether administrative agencies are a
part of the executive department, the legislative department, or some
fourth department of government. 7 The court has been far more protec4. ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 2 states: "The supreme executive power of this State shall be
vested in a chief magistrate, who shall be styled 'the Governor of the State of Arkansas.'" Art.
VI, § 1, as amended by amendment 37, provides that: "The Executive Department of this State
shall consist of a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer of State, Auditor
of State, Attorney General, and Commissioner of State Lands ....
"
5. ARK. CONST. art. VII, § 1 states: "The judicial power of the State shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, in circuit courts, in county and probate courts, and in justices of the peace. The
General Assembly may also vest such jurisdiction as may be deemed necessary in municipal corporation courts, courts of common pleas, where established, and, when deemed expedient, may
establish separate courts of chancery."
6. In one of the few cases in which the issue of combining executive and legislative powers in
a single agency was even raised, the court seemed to view the phenomenon as an accomplished
fact that could not be reversed. Hickenbottom v. McCain, 207 Ark. 485, 181 S.W.2d 226 (1944).
In response to an employer's contention that the act creating the Employment Security Division in
the Department of Labor blended executive, legislative, and judicial powers in a single agency
contrary to separation of powers, the court stated:
In our opinion, [the act] does not offend against any of [the separation of powers]
provisions. It does create an administrative agency, charged with the duty of enforcing
its provisions, but it does nothing more, and we do not find in the provisions of the
Constitution above referred to or elsewhere in the Constitution any inhibition against
the employment of such an agency for such a purpose. To do so would greatly, and we
think, unduly restrict the power inhering in the General Assembly to create agencies of
this character. The General Assembly, in the exercise of its legislative power, has found
it necessary to create a number of such agencies, to the functioning of which many of
the same constitutional objections have been unsuccessfully interposed . ...
Id. at 491-92, 181 S.W.2d at 229.
The exercise of executive and judicial powers by the Arkansas Legislative Council is discussed
in some detail in Powers, Separationof Powers: The Unconstitutionality of the Arkansas Legislative Council, 36 ARK. L. REV. 124 (1982).
7. In Parkin Printing & Stationery Co. v. Arkansas Printing & Lithographing Co., 234 Ark.
697, 354 S.W.2d 560 (1962), the court held that the State Highway Department was a part of the
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tive of the barrier surrounding the judicial department. Administrative
agencies are clearly not a part of the judicial department of government, and the court has often invoked separation of powers when an
agency is granted powers that resemble those traditionally reserved to
the judiciary or when the courts are granted broad powers to review
agency decisions. Although such cases occasionally require distinguishing executive power and judicial power, they are more likely to involve
drawing the line between legislative power and judicial .power.
The court's opinion in the 1982 case of Ozarks Electric Cooperative Corporation v. Turner8 illustrates the tests frequently applied to
define the respective powers of the courts and administrative agencies.
The case involved the appropriate forum for resolving a dispute between a utility customer and a public utility concerning the amount
charged for reconnection of electric service following a termination of
service for alleged meter tampering. In Ozarks, the utility discovered
that the meter seal and glass on a customer's electric meter had been
broken and the meter was not recording electricity usage. The utility
notified the customer and threatened to discontinue service unless the
customer paid $1,500, the amount the utility estimated to be due for
service rendered. 9 Rather than appeal the termination to the Commission, 10 the customer paid the additional charge, but he then filed suit in
circuit court for malicious prosecution and the return of the $1,500.
The trial judge directed a verdict for the utility on the malicious prosecution count but submitted the claim for $1,500 to the jury, which
awarded the customer $1,250. The principal issue on appeal was
whether the circuit court or the Public Service Commission was the
appropriate forum to resolve the dispute as to the amount owed by the
customer for service during the period the meter failed to measure
properly the service provided the customer.
The supreme court decided the case by distinguishing legislative
executive department. According to the dissent, this was the first time the court had ever held that
any administrative agency was a part of the executive rather than the legislative department.
8. 277 Ark. 209, 640 S.W.2d 438 (1982).
9. The Arkansas Public Service Commission's Rules and Regulations Governing Utility Service permit a utility to terminate service for the "unauthorized or fraudulent use or procurement
of service or tampering with wires, pipes, meters, or other utility equipment." Rules 8(A)(5) and
(L)(3), Arkansas Public Service Commission, Rules and Regulations Governing Utility Service
(1981) [hereinafter cited as APSC Rules]. Before reconnecting service, the utility may require a
"reasonable payment for the estimated services rendered" or may refuse to reconnect service until
ordered by the Commission. Rule 8(M), APSC Rules.
10. If the customer wishes to contest the termination, he may obtain a hearing before the
Commission within three days of applying for relief, and the Commission must make a finding on
the merits within one day after the hearing. Rule 8(J)(12), APSC Rules.
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functions, which can properly be performed by an administrative
agency, from judicial functions, which can not. According to the court,
the appropriate line between the two functions was announced by the
United States Supreme Court in Prentis v. Atlantic Coastline:1
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they
stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to
exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation on the other hand looks
to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to
be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its
power.

12

Applying the Prentis test to the case before it, the Arkansas court
concluded:
There is an analogy to the present case. Here, the appellee is not
questioning the rate that appellant charged-an issue that would be
11. 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
12. 277 Ark. at 211, 640 S.W.2d at 440 (quoting 211 U.S. at 226). The test announced by
the United States Supreme Court in Prentis was not designed to distinguish judicial and legislative functions for purposes of the separation of powers doctrine. The issue before the Court in
Prentis was whether a proceeding before the Virginia State Corporation Commission fixing railroad rates was a proceeding before a court of a state, which United States Courts were forbidden
to enjoin under the predecessor of 28 U.S C. § 2283 (1982). Based on the quoted language, the
Supreme Court held that a ratemaking proceeding was legislative in character and therefore could
be enjoined by a federal court. The Court expressly declined to address the separation of powers
issues raised by the case and assumed that the Virginia State Corporation Commission could
exercise both judicial and legislative powers.
Despite the context in which the Prentis test was developed, the Arkansas Supreme Court
adopted the test for use in resolving separation of powers questions. In City of Fort Smith v. Dept.
of Pub. Util., 195 Ark. 513, 113 S.W.2d 100 (1938), an order of the Department of Public Utilities (the predecessor of the Public Service Commission) invalidating a municipal ordinance was
challenged on the grounds that the Department had acted in a judicial capacity. The supreme
court applied the Prentis test and concluded that the Department had acted legislatively since the
character of the final act (i.e., the establishment of rules and regulations governing utility service)
was legislative.
The Prentis test was also applied in Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Town of Hatfield, 219
Ark. 515, 243 S.W.2d 378 (1951). There the court upheld the power of the Public Service Commission to determine whether a town council had approved the sale of a utility system by one
utility to another since the determination was incidental to the final legislative act of determining
that the sale was in the public interest.
The first case in which the Prentis test resulted in the characterization of a power as judicial
rather than legislative was Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Coxsey, 257 Ark. 534, 518 S.W.2d
485 (1975). In that case a writ of prohibition was sought by a public utility to prevent a chancellor from resolving a dispute between two public utilities as to which would provide service to a
particular customer. In dismissing the application for the writ, the supreme court applied the
Prentis test and held that the allocation of territory between two public utilities was a legislative
function delegated to the Public Service Commission, but the resolution of a dispute between two
utilities as to which held the exclusive right to serve an existing customer under existing PSC
certificates was a judicial function that could be exercised only by a court.

19841

SEPARATION OF POWERS

283

properly before the APSC. Nor does he challenge the power of the
APSC to set the rate charged by Ozarks and to determine whether
that amount is a reasonable rate. What appellee does contend is that
the total amount Ozarks charged him is excessive in light of all the
circumstances and that the money is being wrongfully kept by
Ozarks. Appellee disputed the charge that he had tampered with the
meter and he was free to show what other factors might have contributed to a lower meter reading and for what length of time the meter
was recording lower than average reading. The issue was judicial in
nature and appellee was entitled to have it resolved in a court of law.
Were the APSC to hear this case, it would not be acting in a legislative capacity. It would not be looking to the future and making a new
rule or standard affecting the public or a group generally. Rather, it
would be determining issues of fact from past actions involving a
particularindividual within existing laws and deciding the liabilities
involved."3

II.

SCOPE OF ARTICLE

Ozarks illustrates a separation of powers issue that often arises in
connection with administrative agencies. When an agency attempts to
make factual determinations affecting the rights and liabilities of a particular person, the agency's decision may be challenged on the grounds
that the agency is exercising judicial power."4 The Ozarks opinion, as
13. 277 Ark. at 211-12, 640 S.W.2d at 440 (emphasis added).
14. The court in Ozarks tended no change in the well established rule that the character of a
proceeding is determined by the final act resulting from the proceeding. See Southwestern Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Town of Hatfield, 219 Ark. 515, 521, 243 S.W.2d 378, 382. The Court in Ozarks
quoted the following statement from Hatfield: "But the effect of the inquiry, and of the decision
upon it, is determined by the nature of the act to which the inquiry and decision lead up." 277
Ark. at 211, 640 S.W.2d at 439. Pursuant to this rule, an administrative agency can perform
judicial type functions incidental to the exercise of a final legislative act. The court prefers to use
euphemisms such as "administrative adjudication" or "exercise of quasi-judicial power" to describe the actions of the agency, but clearly persons not a part of the judicial department are
exercising powers of a type historically performed by that department. In Ozarks, for example,
the court stated: "This does not mean that quasi-judicial functions cannot be performed in the
exercise of the powers conferred for the general purposes of regulating and controlling public
utilities." 277 Ark. at 210-11, 640 S.W.2d at 439.
Under the rule that the character of a proceeding is determined by the nature of the final act,
the court has approved the exercise by the Public Service Commission of such traditional judicial
functions as determining the constitutionality of legislation, Oklahoma Gas and Elec. Co. v. Lankford, 278 Ark. 595, 648 S.W.2d 65 (1983); McGehee v. Mid South Gas Co., 235 Ark. 50, 357
S.W.2d 282 (1962); interpreting state and federal statutes, General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v.
Lowe, 263 Ark. 727, 569 S.W.2d 71 (1978); McGehee v. Mid South Gas Company, 235 Ark. 50,
357 S.W.2d 382 (1962); Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark.-Mo. Power Co., 221 Ark. 638, 255
S.W.2d 674 (1953); and determining questions of law and fact, Farmers Elec. Coop. Corp. v.
Arkansas Power and Light Co., 220 Ark. 652, 249 S.W.2d 837 (1952); Southwestern Gas & Elec.
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well as earlier opinions applying the Prentistests, suggests that the appropriate response in such a case is to apply the court's definitions,
classify the power being exercised by the agency as either judicial or
legislative in character, and then assign that power exclusively to one
department of government. Only the courts can determine issues of fact
affecting the rights and liabilities of a particular person under existing
laws. Administrative agencies make factual determinations that apply
prospectively to the public in general or a specific group.
A second separation of powers problem that arises in connection
with administrative agencies involves judicial review of agency determinations of fact. Courts are typically empowered to review the factual
determinations of administrative agencies, and in some circumstances,
the availability of such review is probably a constitutional imperative.
But agency determinations of fact, even those affecting the rights and
liabilities of a single person, sometimes involve the exercise of legislative or executive power to formulate public policy. When an agency has
been granted legislative or judicial discretion, a court may encroach on
powers reserved to the legislative or executive departments when it reviews the agency's factual determinations de novo and substitutes its

judgment on questions of public policy for that of the agency. 1'

Co. v. Town of Hatfield, 219 Ark. 515, 243 S.W.2d 378 (1951). But in those cases in which the
court has sanctioned the exercise of judicial functions by the Public Service Commission incidental to the exercise of a final legislative act, the final act was "legislative" within the restrictive
definition used by the court in Ozarks. In other words, the final act in each of'the cited cases was
the adoption by the Commission of a rule or order operating prospectively and affecting the general public. Allied Tel. Co. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 239 Ark. 492, 393 S.W.2d 206
(1965), illustrates the court's insistence that the final act of the Commission be legislative in
character before the court will approve the exercise of judicial type functions by the Commission.
In that case, the Commission ordered a telephone utility to comply with the terms of a contract
governing the routing of intrastate long distance calls. Although the court upheld the Commission's action, it was clearly bothered by the Commission's failure to couch its final act as a legislative rather than a judicial act:
While this is a minor issue in the case, we nevertheless conclude that the Commission
acted beyond its jurisdiction in enjoining Allied from the breach of a contract on the
broad terms as contained in the aforesaid copied order. Of course, if there had been a
finding that such rerouting of calls would result in inadequate service to the telephone
using public, then the Commission would have had jurisdiction, since, under Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 73-218 (1957), its duty is to see that service is adequate, etc. But there was no
finding in this case that the mere rerouting of Sheridan long distance calls through
Fordyce would result in any inadequate service; and the Commission is not the proper
forum to enjoin a mere breach of contract.
Id. at 504, 393 S.W.2d at 213.
15. De novo review is an elastic concept. It may or may not include the right to present new
evidence to the reviewing court. The term is used broadly in this article to refer to any standard of
review which permits the reviewing court to substitute its judgment on factual issues for that of an
administrative agency, whether or not the court may hear new evidence on the issues.
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This article examines the extent to which Arkansas administrative
agencies can be vested with the power to make factual determinations
affecting the rights and liabilities of particular persons, and the extent
to which agency factual determinations can be subjected to review by
the courts."0 The cases considered have been grouped into four categories for discussion purposes:
I. Cases or controversies in which a particularperson seeks somethingfrom government which is within the discretion of government to
grant or withhold. Examples are proceedings determining the validity
of tort or contract claims against the state, proceedings determining
entitlement to public benefits, proceedings granting or revoking a license to engage in a particular occupation or activity, and proceedings
involving discharges from public employment or removal from public
office.
II. Cases or controversies in which government seeks something
from a particularperson. Examples are proceedings involving the government's power of eminent domain, proceedings involving the government's power to regulate the use of property, and proceedings involving
the government's power of taxation.
III. Cases or controversies between two private persons in which
government has a direct interest. The prime example is an election
contest.
IV. Cases or controversies between two private persons in which
the only interests at stake are those of the two parties.
III.
CONTROVERSIES IN WHICH A PARTICULAR
PERSON SEEKS SOMETHING FROM GOVERNMENT
When a private party seeks "something" from the state, the power
16. Because judicial review of administrative action in Arkansas has been a fairly popular
law review subject, this article does not undertake a comprehensive examination of the issue. For
articles discussing judicial review of administrative decisions in more detail, see Carnes, Administrative License Revocation in Arkansas, 14 ARK. L. REV. 139 (1959); Covington, JudicialReview
of the Awards of the Arkansas Workmen's Compensation Commission, 2 ARK. L. REV. 139
(1948); Davis, Mandamus to Review Administrative Action in Arkansas, 11 ARK. L. REV. 351
(1957); Parker, Administrative Law in Arkansas, 4 ARK. L. REV. 107 (1950); Wilson and Carnes,
JudicialReview of Administrative Agencies in Arkansas, 25 ARK. L. REV. 397 (1972); Comment,
Judicial Review of Findings of the Arkansas Public Service Commission, 2 ARK. L. REV. 67
(1947); Note, Taxpayer Status to Challenge Administrative Actions Under the Arkansas Administrative ProcedureAct, 25 ARK. L. REV. 160 (1971).
The article focuses on separation of powers at the state level, but many of the cases discussed
involve county or municipal officers or tribunals. Although the separation of powers doctrine may
not apply at the local government level, these cases are instructive insofar as they characterize a
particular power as judicial or legislative.
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to determine whether he is entitled to that "something", based on existing laws and present or past facts, is not necessarily reserved to the
judiciary. The decision to grant something to or withhold something
from a particular person may be a legislative function, and the fact
that the decision affects the rights or liabilities of only one person does
not change the character of the decision. On the other hand, rather
than retain the discretion, either directly or through an administrative
agency, to determine whether or not a particular person should receive
something, the legislature can create a "right" in a particular person.
Once a person's interest in something is elevated to the status of a statutory right, then determining whether the person possesses that right
becomes the type of question that either an administrative agency or
the courts can consider.
A.

Contract and Tort Claims Against the State

The power to resolve contract and tort claims against the state
exemplifies a governmental function that can, consistent with separation of powers, be vested in either an administrative agency or the
courts. The power satisfies the definition of judicial power employed in
Ozarks. It involves "determining issues of fact from past actions involving a particular individual with existing laws and deciding the liabilities
involved.' 7 But the power to hear and decide the merits of claims
against the state is vested in the Arkansas State Claims Commission
rather than the courts.' 8 Decisions of the Commission are final and are
not subject to judicial review.1 9
The obvious way to reconcile the activities of the State Claims
Commission with the separation of powers is to characterize the resolution of claims against the state as the exercise of legislative power.2 0
17. The quoted language is from the court's opinion in Ozarks. The full quotation is set out
in the text, supra note 13.
18. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 13-1402 (Supp. 1983). Claims arising under the Worker's Compensation Act, the Employment Security Act, or Teacher Retirement Act, or under laws providing for
old-age assistance grants, child welfare grants, blind pensions, or similar law, are excluded from
the jurisdiction of the Claims Commission.
19. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406 (1979).
20. The supreme court has never considered whether vesting the State Claims Commission
with judicial functions violates the separation of powers doctrine. In Auditor v. Davies, 2 Ark. 494
(1840), the court stated that the State Auditor could not exercise judicial power but found it
unnecessary to consider whether the approval of claims against the state was the exercise of judicial power. In Eckert, Another Decade of State Immunity to Suit-1937-1947, 2 ARK. L. REV.
375, 379 (1948), the author noted the possible separation of powers problem raised by the use of
an administrative agency to hear claims against the state. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that a constitutional provision similar to the Arkansas separation of powers provision did
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Such a characterization is supported by article XVI, section 2 of the
Arkansas Constitution, which states that the General Assembly shall
"provide for the payment of all just and legal debts of the State." Incidental to the exercise of the legislative power of providing for payment
of all just and legal debts of the State, the General Assembly can itself
determine, or vest in an administrative agency, the power to determine
what debts are "just and legal."'"
A question that has not been authoritatively determined is whether
separation of powers precludes using the courts to resolve claims
against the state. If determining the merits of a claim against the state
represents the exercise of a legislative power, the separation of powers
article would prohibit exercise of the power by the courts. Any inquiry
into the ability of the courts to hear claims against the state is hampered by the pervasive influence of article V, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution, which provides that the state shall never be made a
defendant in any of its courts. Because sovereign immunity has usually
barred any attempt by the judicial branch of government to hear tort
or contract claims against the state, the courts have seldom found it
necessary to consider whether such a power is legislative or judicial in
character. What little precedent exists indicates that separation of powers is not an obstacle to judicial consideration of the validity of claims
against the state.
The Constitution of 1836 contained a separation of powers provision, 2 2 but it did not bar suits against the state in the courts of the
state. In fact, the General Assembly was specifically authorized to direct in what courts and in what manner suits were to be brought
against the state. 23 The first session of the General Assembly enacted a
statute allowing suits to be brought against the state in both equity and
not prevent the legislature from conferring jurisdiction to hear claims against the state on the
State Board of Adjustment. Ballenger Constr. Co. v. State Bd. of Adjustment, 234 Ala. 377, 175
So. 387 (1937).
21. Prior to 1935 the General Assembly did discharge the function directly by passing a
special appropriation to pay those claims it approved. At each legislative session between 1935 and
1943 the General Assembly established a Special Claims Commission consisting of the State
Comptroller, the State Auditor, and the Attorney General, and appropriated funds to pay claims
approved by the Commission. See Ross, State Immunity and the Arkansas Claims Commission,
21 ARK. L. REV. 180, 186 (1967). See also Eckert, supra note 20, at 379; Waterman, One Hundred Years of a State's Immunity From Suit, 2 ARK. L. REV. 353, 372 (1948). The Special
Claims Commission was replaced in 1945 by a semi-permanent Board of Fiscal Control, 1945
Ark. Acts 53, and the latter agency became the present State Claims Commission in 1949. 1949
Ark. Acts. 462. The 1949 act was superseded by 1955 Ark. Acts 276.
22. ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. III, § 1.
23. ARK. CoNsT. of 1836, art. IV, § 22.
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law courts, and providing for the transmission of any judgment to the

legislature so that "an appropriation might be made to satisfy the judg2" the Arkansas Supreme
ment."2 In State v. Curran
Court upheld the
statute against the contention that the state could not be sued in its

own courts. This opinion, as well as other opinions from the period,
suggests that the supreme court considered the resolution of claims
against the state as the exercise of judicial rather than legislative
power.1 6 But these early cases are of doubtful precedential value on the
separation of powers question because the specific constitutional language authorizing the legislature to use the courts to determine claims
against the state made it unlikely that the practice would be challenged
as a violation of separation of powers.
The framers of the Constitution of 1874 included both a separa-

tion of powers provision2 7 and a provision barring suits against the

state. 8 In most post-1874 cases dealing with the power of the courts to
resolve claims against the state, the issue of sovereign immunity has
overshadowed the issue of separation of powers. There is, nevertheless,
some support for the proposition that the separation of powers article
does not bar the use of the courts to determine what debts of the state
are "just and legal."
A 1929 act of the General Assembly illustrates legislative use of
the courts to determine the validity of claims against the state.2 9 The
Act directed the Attorney General to bring suit in Pulaski County
24. 1837 Ark. Acts, p. 742.
25. 12 Ark. 321 (1851), rev'd on other grounds, 56 U.S. 304 (1853). The history of Mr.
Curran's efforts to enforce his claim against the state of Arkansas is detailed in Waterman, supra
note 21, at 354-58.
26. Many of these early suits against the State arose out of the failure of the State Bank of
Arkansas and the Real Estate Bank of Arkansas. See, e.g., Beers v. Arkansas, 17 Ark. 2 (1856),
aftid, 61 U.S. 527 (1857); Pike v. State Bank, 14 Ark. 403 (1854); State Bank v. Curran, 10 Ark.
142 (1849). Other cases suggesting that separation of powers does not prevent the courts from
hearing claims against the state include Danley v. Whiteley, 14 Ark. 687 (1854); Auditor v. Davies, 2 Ark. 494 (1840).
During this period the legislature seems to have shared the view that the courts were the
appropriate forum for determining the merits of a claim against the state. Even when the legislature eventually withdrew the state's consent to be sued in its own courts like any other defendant,
it continued to use the circuit courts to make factual determinations.regarding a claim. 1856-57
Ark. Acts, p. 153, discussed in Waterman, supra note 21, at 359-60.
27. ARK. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1 and 2.
28. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 20. The Constitutions of 1861, 1864, and 1868, like the Constitution of 1836, did not prohibit suits against the state. Dean Waterman suggests that art. V, § 2was included in the Constitution of 1874 to ensure that the courts would not be used to enforce
certain bonds issued by the reconstruction government. Waterman, supra note 21, at 361. The
first amendment to the Constitution of 1874 prohibited any appropriation to pay such bonds.
29. 1929Ark. Acts 120.
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Chancery Court against the heirs of a certain individual to confirm the
state's title to the land purchased from the individual and imposed on
the court the duty to determine the amount of unpaid purchase price
and interest due the heirs.3" The Act also appropriated $27,000 to pay
any amount found due by the court. The court determined that the
amount due the heirs was $27,887, and the heirs agreed to remit all
amounts in excess of the $27,000 appropriated to pay their claims. In
upholding the validity of the act, the supreme court stated:
The appropriation here involved was not made in the general appropriation bill, but was, in fact, made in a separate bill, which embraced
but one subject, this being an adjudication of the controversy between
the state and the Urquhart heirs. The Legislature itself might have
ascertainedthe amount both of principal and interest, and have made
an appropriation accordingly, but it elected to constitute another
agency to make this finding of fact, and made an appropriationin
what was assumed to be a sufficient amount to pay both the principal
and the interest, and, under the remittitur which has been entered,
the appropriation is sufficient."'
Apparently, the court saw no problem under the separation of powers
article with the legislature using a court to ascertain the amount due
from the state.
A series of opinions during the 1930's involving suits against the
State Highway Commission also supports the conclusion that separation of powers does not preclude the legislature from using the courts to
determine the validity of claims against the state. In 1928, as part of a
massive highway construction program, the General Assembly enacted
a statute that appeared to authorize suits against the Highway Commission and its officers for claims related to the administration of the
program." The legislature also appropriated fifteen million dollars to
pay for the construction program. The act prompted a number of suits
30. The history of the attempts by the landowner and his heirs to collect the unpaid purchase
price is recounted in Urquhart v. State, 180 Ark. 937, 23 S.W.2d 963 (1930). In 1909 the legislature appropriated funds to pay the balance of the purchase price including interest and directed
the state auditor to calculate and pay the actual amount due to the executor of the landowner. A
dispute arose regarding the legal description of the land covered by the contract, and the executor
sued the state penitentiary board to reform the contract and recover the price agreed in the contract. In Jobe v. Urquhart, 98 Ark. 525, 136 S.W. 663 (1911), the court dismissed the suit as one
against the state. The executor then attempted by mandamus to compel the auditor to calculate
and pay the amount due, but the court held that the claim was a pre-existing claim the payment
of which had not been approved by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly as required by
article V, section 26 of the Constitution. Jobe v. Urquhart, 102 Ark. 470, 143 S.W. 121 (1912).
31. 180 Ark. at 943, 23 S.W.2d at 965 (emphasis added).
32. 1928 Ark. Acts 2 (Special Session).

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:279

by contractors in which the sovereign immunity issue was raised. In a

series of opinions, a majority of the Arkansas Supreme Court agreed
that the suits were against the state, and a different majority agreed
that the state could not waive sovereign immunity, but the court nevertheless allowed the suits to proceed since two justices believed the suits
were not against the state and two justices believed the state could consent to be sued."3 The court considered the issue five times in two years
without reaching a consensus on the sovereign immunity questions.3 ,
The stalemate finally ended in Arkansas State Highway Commission
v. Nelson Brothers,3 when, following a change in its makeup, the court
overruled its early decisions and held that a suit against the Highway
Commission was a suit against the state and that the General Assembly could not grant permission for the state to be sued in its own courts.
The significance of the highway commission cases is that despite the
court's long struggle to reach a consensus, no one raised separation of

powers as an obstacle to judicial consideration of tort or contract
claims against the state.
Ozarks and many of the court's other opinions dealing with the
line between judicial power and legislative power proceed on the assumption that all governmental powers can be neatly segregated into
three categories and assigned exclusively to one department of government. Urquhart and the highway commission cases suggest that not all
governmental powers are susceptible to such treatment. Certain governmental functions are hybrid in character and can, in the discretion of
33. The history of the highway department cases is discussed in Waterman, supra note 21, at
362-68. See generally Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Dodge, 186 Ark. 640, 55 S.W.2d 71
(1932); Baer v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 185 Ark. 590, 48 S.W.2d 842 (1932); Campbell v. State Highway Comm'n, 183 Ark. 780, 38 S.W.2d 753 (1931); Arkansas State Highway
Comm'n v. Dodge, 181 Ark. 539, 26 S.W.2d 879 (1930). See also Arkansas State Highway
Comm'n v. Keaton, 187 Ark. 306, 59 S.W.2d 481 (1933); Bull v. Ziegler, 186 Ark. 477, 54
S.W.2d 283 (1932). Finally, in Watson v. Dodge, 187 Ark. 1055, 63 S.W.2d 993 (1933), the
supreme court declared that "it is perfectly evident that it was the purpose of the framers of the
Constitution of 1874 to withdraw all power and authority theretofore existing in the Legislature to
grant permission for the State to be sued by individuals or corporations in her courts." Id. at
1061, 63 S.W.2d at 995.
34. In Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Dodge, 186 Ark. 640, 55 S.W.2d 71 (1932), the
court was reduced to explaining its inability to reach a consensus as follows:
It will be seen that out of the conflicting views of a majority of the several members of
the court a very definite result has been reached; i.e., that in a proper case the highway
commission may be sued when authority for bringing the suit may be found in the
statute. Since this is the effect of our holding in both the Dodge and Baer Cases, supra,
we think it is more important that this question be definitely settled than a too firm
insistence be held to our individual views . . ..
Id. at 646, 55 S.W.2d at 73.
35. 191 Ark. 629, 87 S.W.2d 394 (1935).
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the General Assembly, be assigned either to the courts or to an administrative agency without violating separation of powers. Because the
General Assembly cannot waive sovereign immunity, it has no choice
but to employ an administrative agency to determine the validity of
tort and contract claims against the state."6
If sovereign immunity could be waived, and the General Assembly
did elect to use the courts to determine the validity of tort and contract
claims against the state, another type of separation of powers problem
would be presented. Separation of powers requires that the legislature
retain the ultimate authority to appropriate public funds for the payment of the "just and legal debts" of the state. On the other hand, the
courts would be reluctant to accept the responsibility of rendering unenforceable advisory opinions to the General Assembly regarding the
merits of claims against the state. It might therefore be necessary to
adopt a procedure similar to that employed in Urquhart and the highway commission cases. The General Assembly could appropriate in advance the funds from which to pay any claims determined to be valid
by the courts and thereby ensure that the courts would be able to enforce their determinations. 38
B.

Entitlement to Public Benefits

Pursuant to its constitutional power to appropriate public funds,39
the General Assembly may decide to make benefits available to persons
meeting certain criteria. Separation of powers does not require the
General Assembly to use the courts to determine whether a particular
36. Congress has assigned the task of resolving tort and contract claims against the federal
government to the district courts, which are Article III "judicial" courts, but it has also vested the
Claims Court, which is an Article I "legislative" court, with the power resolve contract claims. 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982).
37. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 408 (1792). Cf. Kirk v. North Little Rock Special
Dist., 174 Ark. 943, 298 S.W. 212 (1927):
It is the duty of the courts to decide actual controversies by a judgment or decree which
can be carried into effect, but not to give opinions upon controversies or declare principles of law which cannot be executed or which cannot have any practical effect in
settling the rights of the litigants under the judgment or decree entered.
Id. at 944-45, 298 S.W. at 213.
38. The General Assembly currently appropriates in advance funds from which to pay small
claims (those under $2,000) awarded by the Claims Commission. See, e.g., 1983 Ark. Acts 301,
§§ 5, 6, 8, 9. Larger claims are paid by the state agency against which the claim is awarded, and
funds are then appropriated to reimburse the agency. See, e.g., 1983 Ark. Acts 20. When the
State Highway Commission condemns private property, it must determine the damages to be paid
the owner of the property. See State Highway Commission v. Partain, 192 Ark. 127, 90 S.W.2d
968 (1936).
39. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 21.
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person meets the statutory criteria. It can assign the function to an
administrative agency and can even make the decisions of that agency
binding and conclusive on the courts.
In at least one situation the General Assembly has expressly precluded judicial review of agency action on an application for public
benefits. Applications for welfare assistance are initially reviewed at the
county level with a right of appeal to the State Division of Social Services. 0 The relevant statute provides that: "The decision of the . . .
[Division] shall be final; nor shall any action be brought in any court
having for its object the changing of a ruling of said . . . [Division] on
the merits of any application."4 1 No-review clauses, such as that applicable to welfare determinations, can be justified on the grounds that
they permit the agency responsible for administering a benefit program
to develop uniform policies consistent with the ability of the state to
meet the costs of the program.4 2
Actions of the Division of Social Services cannot, of course, be
shielded completely from judicial scrutiny. The courts could intervene
if benefits were being dispensed in an unconstitutional manner since
even purely legislative acts are subject to judicial review on constitutional grounds.4" For example, the court of appeals has ruled that use
of a gender-based classification to determine entitlement to workers'
compensation benefits violates article II, section 18 of the Arkansas
Constitution.44 If the Division of Social Services denied welfare assistance on the basis of sex or race,4 5 the no-review clause quoted above
would not prevent judicial consideration of a constitutional challenge.
In such a case, a court would not be encroaching on the exercise of
40.

ARK. STAT. ANN.

§ 83-135 (1976).

41. Id. The constitutionality of the statute has never been tested. In Hardin v. Devalls Bluff,
256 Ark. 480, 508 S.W.2d 559 (1974), the supreme court cited the statute, without questioning its
constitutionality, as an example of one which precluded judicial review of agency action.
42. See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 370-73 (1974), discussing the purposes underlying
38 U.S.C. § 211 (a), which prohibits judicial review of benefit determinations by the Administrator
of Veterans' Affairs.
43. In Johnson v. Robison, id., the United States Supreme Court held that a no-review clause
did not bar a suit challenging the constitutionality of laws providing benefits for veterans. See also
Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F.Supp. 1295 (D.C. Md. 1975), holding that no-review clause applicable
to decisions of Administrator of Veterans Affairs did not bar judicial consideration of due process
questions.
44. Swafford v. Tyson Foods, 2 Ark. Ct. App. 343, 621 S.W.2d 862 (1981). ARK. CONST.
art. I1,§ 18 prohibits the General Assembly from granting to "any citizen or class of citizens
privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens."
45. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 3 provides that no citizen shall "ever be deprived of any right,
privilege or immunity, nor exempted from any burden or duty, on account of race, color or previous condition."
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executive or legislative powers. It would be discharging the traditional
judicial function of ensuring adherence by the executive and legislative
departments to the requirements of the constitution. But when constitutional issues are not involved, the General Assembly can preclude judicial review of an administrative determination that a particular person
should receive public benefits.
Instead of giving an administrative agency the exclusive power to
determine who should receive public benefits, an alternative available
to the General Assembly is to create an administrative agency to make
an initial determination and then provide for judicial review of that
determination. An example is the Board of Review, which is empowered to determine based on present or past facts whether an ex-employee is entitled to receive unemployment benefits under the Arkansas
Employment Security Act." Decisions of the Board are subject to judicial review, but factual determinations by the Board are conclusive on
the reviewing court "if supported by substantial evidence and in the
absence of fraud" and the jurisdiction of the court is limited to questions of law. 4 Because there is no vested right to unemployment benefits,"' the General Assembly is not obliged to provide for judicial review
of determinations by the Board of Review, and it could, as it has in the
case of welfare benefits, make the Board's findings conclusive on the
courts. On the other hand, providing for judicial review of Board decisions does not pose separation of powers problems. The General Assembly could use the courts rather than an administrative agency to determine eligibility to receive unemployment benefits. The statutory criteria
for determining eligibility for unemployment benefits are explicit, and
application of the criteria does not involve the exercise of legislative
discretion. 49 Applying explicit statutory criteria to present or past facts
is the type of function that can be vested in the courts. If the courts can
be granted original jurisdiction to determine who should receive unemployment compensation benefits, they can clearly be empowered to re50
view the eligibility determinations of an administrative agency.
46. The Board of Review is actually at the apex of a comprehensive administrative apparatus
which determines the right to receive unemployment compensation. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 811107 (Supp. 1983).
47. Id. The standard of review applicable to Board determinations of fact is discussed in
detail in Harris v. Daniels, 263 Ark. 897, 567 S.W.2d 954 (1978).
48. In Crossett Lumber Co. v. McCain, 205 Ark. 631, 170 S.W.2d 64 (1943), the court held
that the General Assembly could retroactively modify the right to receive unemployment benefits
since the right was not vested.
49. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1105, 81-1106 (Supp. 1983).
50. Once entitlement to a public benefit is "vested," the holder possesses an interest that may
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Licensing

The power to issue and revoke a license to engage in a particular
occupation or activity has traditionally been considered legislative in
character.5 1 The Arkansas Supreme Court has routinely upheld the
delegation of licensing powers to administrative agencies notwithstanding the fact that issuance or revocation of a license usually involves the
determination of the rights and liabilities of a particular person based
on issues of fact from past actions. 2 Given the undisputed character of
the licensing power, it is not surprising that most separation of powers
problems in the licensing context have involved the role of the courts in
the licensing process.
An applicant whose license is denied by an administrative agency
or a licensee whose license is revoked by an administrative agency is
entitled to judicial review of the agency decision,5" but the scope of
be constitutionally protected, and the ability of the General Assembly to use an administrative
agency to determine eligibility becomes more limited. ARK. CONST. art. II, § 8 prevents deprivation of property without due process of law, and ARK. CONST. art. II, § 17 prohibits the passage of
laws impairing the obligations of contracts. In Jones v. Cheney, 253 Ark. 926, 489 S.W.2d 785
(1973), the court held that the latter provision prevented retroactive modification of vested pension rights. Consequently, while the General Assembly can use an administrative agency to determine eligibility to receive vested rights, the person claiming a vested right protected by the constitution is entitled to have a judicial ruling on any constitutional questions. For the reasons
discussed infra note 11, the claimant may be entitled to de novo review of agency factual determinations affecting interests protected by the constitution. In two cases involving judicial review of
the right to receive vested municipal retirement benefits, the court applied an arbitrary and capricious standard of review. City of Little Rock v. Martin, 244 Ark. 323, 424 S.W.2d 869 (1968);
Dunn v. Dauley, 232 Ark. 17, 334 S.W.2d 679 (1960).
51. Redfield Tel. Co. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 273 Ark. 498, 621 S.W.2d 470
(1981); Veteran's Taxicab Co. v. City of Fort Smith, 213 Ark. 687, 212 S.W.2d 341 (1948); State
Medical Bd. of Ark. Medical Soc'y v. McCrary, 95 Ark. 511, 130 S.W. 544 (1910). Issuance and
revocation of licenses to engage in the practice of law is a judicial power by virtue of Amendment
28 to the constitution. The courts can also be empowered to revoke a license incidental to the
conviction of a criminal offense.
52. Eclectic State Medical Bd. v. Beatty, 203 Ark. 2194, 156 S.W.2d 246 (1941). See also
Consumers Co-op Ass'n v. Hill, 233 Ark. 59, 342 S.W.2d 657 (1961). On several occasions the
supreme court has prevented lower courts from interfering with the licensing process. Schirmer v.
Light, 222 Ark. 693, 262 S.W.2d 143 (1953) (quo warranto issued to prevent chancellor from
considering revocation of medical license since Eclectic State Medical Bd. had exclusive jurisdiction); Eclectic State Medical Bd. v. Beatty, 203 Ark. 294, 156 S.W.2d 246 (1941) (injunction
dismissed for same reason).
53. The Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act defines "adjudication" so as to include licensing. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-701(d) (1976). An aggrieved party can obtain judicial review of an
adjudication by filing a petition with the Pulaski County Circuit Court. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5713(a) (Supp. 1983). Technically, the petition procedure does not constitute an appeal since the
decision of a nonjudicial body cannot be "appealed" to a judicial body. Prairie County v. Matthews, 46 Ark. 383, 386 (1885).
If no particular method of obtaining review is prescribed by statute, review of a licensing
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review in licensing cases is limited. Most licensing decisions are tested
by one or both of two standards: (1) whether the decision of the licensing agency is supported by substantial evidence; and (2) whether the
agency's action was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of power.54
The limited scope of review applicable to licensing actions is consistent with the character of the decision under consideration by the
court. A licensing decision typically involves making policy judgments
as to what is in the best interest of the general public. A court cannot
review licensing decisions de novo and substitute its judgment of the
public interest for that of an administrative agency vested with legislative (or executive) discretion to issue or revoke a license. In Goodall v.
decision is available by certiorari, and possibly by mandamus, or injunction. Carnes, supra note
16, at 146; Davis, supra note 16, at 353. The lack of an alternative method of obtaining review is
usually a condition precedent to the availability of review by certiorari or mandamus. McCain v.
Collins, 204 Ark. 521, 164 S.W.2d 448 (1942). The availability of judicial review under ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 5-713(a) makes it unlikely that licensing decisions will be reviewed in the future
using either of these writs. Wilson and Carnes, supra note 16, at 402.
If a license application is denied without an "adjudication" by an officer who has no discretion
but to issue the license, it might be possible to obtain review by applying for a writ of mandamus.
Cf. Cline v. Plaza Personnel Agency, 252 Ark. 956, 481 S.W.2d 749 (1972) (when statute gave
Director of Department of Labor no discretion to deny a license to a person who met statutory
requirements, circuit court could order license issued on application of writ of mandamus).
o 54. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Pulaski County Circuit Court can reverse
an agency decision that is (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of
the agency's statutory authority; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of
law; (5) not supported by substantial evidence of record; or (6) arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-713(f) (Supp. 1983).
Prior to the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act, when the licensing statute provided
for judicial review but failed to state the standard of review, the court applied the equivalent of
the arbitrary and capricious standard. State Licensing Bd. for Gen. Contractors v. Jones, 218 Ark.
188, 235 S.W.2d 547 (1951); Carville v. Smith, 211 Ark. 491, 201 S.W.2d 33 (1947).
It is not clear what the "arbitrary and capricious" standard adds to the "substantial evidence"
standard. An attempt to distinguish the two standards appears in Carder v. Hemstock, 5 Ark. Ct.
App. 115, 633 S.W.2d 384 (1982). See also Woodyard v. Arkansas Diversified Ins. Co., 268 Ark.
94, 594 S.W.2d 13 (1980). The "arbitrary and capricious" standard may allow a court to modify
the sanction imposed by an agency even though there is substantial evidence to support the
agency's determination that a licensing violation has occurred. See Baxter v.Arkansas State Bd. of
Dental Examiners, 269 Ark. 67, 598 S.W.2d 412 (1980) (board's decision supported by substantial evidence but sanction was arbitrary and capricious); Arkansas State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Patrick, 243 Ark. 967, 423 S.W.2d 265 (1968) (same).
Nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act limits other means of review provided by law.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-713(a) (Supp. 1983). According to the survey conducted by Wilson and
Carnes in 1972, there are still a number of licensing statutes on the books providing for de novo
review which may not have been repealed or superseded by the Administrative Procedure Act.
Wilson and Carnes, supra note 16, at 411. Such statutes are of questionable constitutionality after
Goodall v. Williams, 271 Ark. 354, 609 S.W.2d 25 (1980), discussed in the text accompanying
note 55.
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Williams,55 a successful applicant before the Arkansas Beverage Control Board challenged the constitutionality of a statute which granted
citizens opposing the application the right to a trial de novo in circuit
court. In granting a writ of prohibition to prevent a circuit court from
trying the application de novo, the court stated:
Under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 48-301 (Repl. 1977), the issuance of liquor
license depends on the administrative determination of "public convenience and advantage." It is not a determination which is judicially
cognizable since the effort to obtain a permit hinges on executive discretion. Because the right of executive discretion is constitutionally
preserved, its exercise cannot be frustrated through the medium of
trials de novo. We, therefore, hold that Ark. Stat. Ann. § 48-311(E)
(Repl. 1977) is unconstitutional to the extent that it-authorizes the
circuit court to redetermine or disregard the factual basis upon which
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission relies to issue a liquor
56
license.
The decision in Goodall v. Williams should apply to all licensing
statutes which vest an administrative agency with the discretion to issue or withhold a license based on the agency's judgment of the public
interest. It is, therefore, difficult to explain opinions issued subsequent
to Goodall v. Williams in appeals from decisions of the Arkansas
Transportation Commission involving applications for a certificate to
operate as a motor carrier. 57 The issuance of a certificate requires a
showing of "public convenience and necessity," 5 8 a determination that
seems indistinguishable from the showing of "public convenience and
advantage" required of an applicant for a liquor license. When the
Transportation Commission was created to assume some powers of the
Public Service Commission, the supreme court ruled that appeals of
Transportation Commission decisions were to be tried de novo not only
in circuit court, but also in the supreme court.5 9 The court has contin55. Id.
56. Id. at 356, 609 S.W.2d at 27.
57. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-1761 (1979).
58. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-1762 (1979).
59. See Fisher v. Branscum, 243 Ark. 516, 420 S.W.2d 882 (1967) and cases cited therein.
It may be that the de novo review exercised in appeals from the Arkansas Transportation Commission is more limited than the broad scope of review generally connoted by the term "de novo."
In Fisher v. Branscum the court stated that it reviewed Commission decisions de novo, but "in
weighing the evidence, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the . . .Commission." Id. at
518, 420 S.W.2d at 884. The court ends up concluding: "In short, this court's function is to
inquire whether the determination of the Commission is contrary to the weight of the evidence."
Id. at 519, 420 S.W.2d at 885. See also Wisinger v. Stewart, 215 Ark. 827, 223 S.W.2d 604
(1949). Despite the court's attempt to limit the scope of review, it is difficult to avoid the conclu-
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ued to adhere to this standard of review, even after its decision in
Goodall v. Williams. In a recent appeal from a decision of the Transportation Commission denying an application for a certificate of convenience and necessity, the supreme court proceeded to try the application de novo and reverse the decision of the Transportation Commission
because the Commission's findings were "clearly against the preponderance of the evidence." 6 0 It is impossible to reconcile this holding with
the rule of Goodall v. Williams. The legislature has vested the Transportation Commission with the authority to formulate public policy regarding motor carrier routes. The Commission has been given the discretion either to grant or deny applications for motor carrier
certificates based on its assessment of "public convenience and necessity." The supreme court or a lower court encroaches on the exercise of
that discretion when it reviews the record de novo and substitutes its
judgment of the public interest for that of the Commission.
Goodall v. Williams should not limit judicial review in a case
where the licensing statute left no discretion in an administrative
agency to deny a license to an applicant who met certain fixed statutory criteria. In Cline v. Plaza Personnel Agency,"' a corporation applied to the State Director of Labor for a license to operate as a private
employment agency, but the Director refused to issue the license. The
licensing statute required that the applicant pay a $200 license fee and
post a $1,000 bond to guarantee compliance with the terms of the statute. The supreme court affirmed the granting of a writ of mandamus
compelling the Director to issue the license since the statute gave the
Director no discretion to deny a license to an applicant who paid the
filing fee and posted the bond. It rejected the Director's argument that
statutory authority to revoke a license for cause implied a discretionary
power to deny an application in the first instance. Although decided
prior to the court's decision in Goodall v. Williams, the holding supports the conclusion that a court can be empowered to review a licensing decision de novo when the licensing agency is given no discretion to
deny a license. In such a case, the General Assembly has created a
fixed statutory right to a license, and the courts do not encroach on
executive or legislative powers when they determine de novo whether
sion that permitting the court to weigh independently the evidence before the Commission on the
issue of "public convenience and necessity" enables the court to substitute its judgment for that of
the Commission.
60. Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Camden-El Dorado Express Co., 282 Ark. 50, 665 S.W.2d 867
(1984).
61. 252 Ark. 956, 481 S.W.2d 749 (1972):
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the statutory criteria have been satisfied.
The holding of Goodall v. Williams may also have limited applicability to license revocation proceedings. The opinion indicates that de
novo review of an agency licensing decision is inappropriate only when
the decision turns on the exercise of executive or legislative discretion.
There is no inherent right to engage in a particular occupation or activity, and the General Assembly can adopt a licensing statute as a means
of regulating an occupation or activity."' When the licensing statute
provides that a license is to issue only upon a finding of "public convenience and necessity" or "public convenience and advantage," it necessarily gives the licensing agency the discretion to make policy judgments regarding the interests of the general public. The courts are not
at liberty to second guess such public policy judgments. A licensing
agency is seldom given the same broad discretion to make public policy
judgments when faced with a decision whether to revoke a license. The
licensing statute typically lists specific grounds for revocation, or, at a
minimum, requires a showing of "cause" for the revocation. In effect,
the right to keep a license, as opposed to the right to receive a license,
is more likely to rise to the level of a fixed statutory right. Once the
General Assembly elevates an interest to the status of a fixed statutory
right by prohibiting termination of the interest except upon specific
grounds, the courts can be empowered to determine de novo whether
such grounds exist."3
62. But see McCastlain v. R & B Tobacco Co., 242 Ark. 74, 411 S.W.2d 882 (1967), suggesting that an administrative regulation imposing an unusual and unnecessary restriction on a
lawful occupation violates ARK. CONST. art. II, § 2.
63. In Goodall v. Williams, the court stated: "If the interests affected by administrative actions are constitutionally or statutorily preserved or preserved by private agreement, so that enforcement is a matter of right, de novo review by the judiciary of administrative decisions altering
these interests is appropriate." 271 Ark. at 356, 608 S.W.2d at 27. See infra note 93 and accompanying text, regarding de novo review of civil service commission decisions.
In Scott v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1964), the Texas
Supreme Court upheld a statute authorizing de novo judicial review of a decision to revoke a
medical license stating:
There is a difference, legislatively recognized through the years, between an exercise of
the power to examine and issue a medical license, and an exercise of the power to
revoke a medical license for cause. The Legislature has not required that an appeal
from acts of the Board refusing to examine an applicant and to issue a medical license
shall be de novo in the full sense; it has done so with respect to the appeal from an act
of the Board revoking a medical license once granted. It is self-evident that the latter
does not involve a question of public policy and the determination of legislative facts
384 S.W.2d at 690.
Another licensing issue that has not yet been addressed by the Arkansas Supreme Court is the
constitutionality of authorizing administrative agencies to impose fines in connection with licens-
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Discharge of Public Employees and Removal of Public Officers

The Arkansas Supreme Court has also found it difficult to define
the limits of judicial power and legislative power when a public employee is discharged or a public officer is removed from office. A decision to discharge an employee .or remove a public officer affects the
rights and liabilities of the individual involved and is usually based on a
determination of present or past facts, but despite the definition of judicial power set out in the Ozarks opinion, a discharge or removal decision typically represents the exercise of either executive or legislative
power.6"
As in the licensing area, most separation of powers problems arising from administrative decisions to discharge an employee or remove
an officer involve the extent to which such decisions are subject to judicial review. In determining the scope of judicial review, the court has,
until very recently, been strongly. influenced by the nature of the proceeding that led to the discharge or removal. This emphasis on the nature of the proceeding can be explained by the fact that the traditional
method of seeking judicial review of an administrative decision to dising activities. The General Assembly has in fact already granted at least one administrative
agency the power to impose civil fines. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-346 (Supp. 1983) authorizes the
Director of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division to impose civil fines for violation of liquor
regulations. In some jurisdictions traffic fines are now handled entirely by administrative agencies
not a part of the judicial branch of government. Force, Administrative Adjudication of Traffic
Violations Confronts the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 49 TUL. L. REV. 84, 98 n.48 (1974).
Once it is conceded that the power to revoke a license is legislative in character, it becomes difficult to argue that there is any constitutional obstacle to giving an administrative agency the power
to impose the less severe sanction of a civil fine.
64. The power to remove most state and local officers from office is specifically addressed by
the constitution. The House of Representatives has the power to impeach the Governor, all state
officers, judges of the supreme and circuit courts, chancellors, and prosecuting attorneys for "high
crimes and misdemeanors and gross misconduct in office." Impeachments are tried by the Senate.
ARK. CONST. art. XV, §§ 1, 2.
Upon joint address of two thirds of both houses of the General Assembly, the Governor can
remove the Auditor, Treasurer, Secretary of State, Attorney General, judges of the supreme and
circuit courts, chancellors, and prosecuting attorneys "for good cause." ARK. CONST. art. XV, § 3.
The Governor is also empowered to remove members of the Game and Fish Commission and the
State Highway Commission "for the same causes as apply to other constitutional officers," subject
to review by the First District Chancery Court with right of appeal to the supreme court, such
review and appeal "to be without presumption in favor of any findings by the Governor or trial
court." ARK. CONST. amend. 35, § 5; amend. 42, § 4. In addition, the Senate can remove members
of the State Highway Commission, apparently without cause and without judicial review. ARK.
CONST. amend. 42, § 4. Amendment 35 was held to be self-executing in Rockefeller v. Hogue, 224
Ark. 1029, 429 S.W.2d 85 (1968).
The circuit court can remove any county or township officer from office for "incompetency,
corruption, gross immorality, criminal conduct, malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance in office." ARK. CONsT. art. VII, § 27.
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charge an employee or remove an officer was by application to the circuit court for a writ of certiorari.
Act 88 of 1873 gave circuit courts the power to issue writs of certiorari to any officer or board of officers, city or town council, or any
inferior tribunal "to correct any erroneous or void proceeding." 5 In an
early case interpreting the Act the supreme court concluded that the
statute merely restated the common law and did not enlarge the scope
of the writ of certiorari. 6 When the action of an officer or inferior tribunal is "purely legislative, executive, and administrative," it is not reviewable by writ of certiorari. But if the proceeding leading to the action by the officer or inferior tribunal is "judicial" or "quasi-judicial"
then review is available in the circuit court by writ of certiorari.6 7 In a
subsequent case the court stated the test for the availability of certiorari as "whether the act sought to be reviewed is done in a judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity, and not merely in a legislative, executive, or
administrative capacity." 6 8
When confronted with the question whether a public officer removed from office was entitled to judicial review, the court applied the
same test. In Hall v. Bledsoe,"' a superintendent of the State Hospital
who was discharged by the hospital board sought judicial review of the
discharge by applying to the Pulaski County Circuit Court for a writ of
certiorari. The supreme court held that certiorari was available since
the board acted in a quasi-judicial capacity when it removed the superintendent. The court then addressed what it perceived to be the more
serious question presented by the case-the scope of judicial review. It
concluded that the sole purpose of the judicial proceeding was to review
the action of the board for errors of law, one of which was the legal
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the board's decision. Contrary to
the common law, Act 88 of 1873 specifically provided that "evidence
dehors the record" could be introduced in the certiorari proceeding
before the circuit court. The supreme court explained that this provision permitted the circuit court to hear evidence outside the record
before the lower tribunal "in order to ascertain what evidence was
65. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-302 (1968).
66. Pine Bluff Water & Light Co. v. City of Pine Bluff, 62 Ark. 196, 35 S.W. 227 (1896).
67. Id. The issue in the case was whether a taxing ordinance of the City of Pine Bluff was
subject to review by certiorari. The supreme court held it was not since the action of the council
was purely legislative. See also Note, The Extent to Which the Writ of Certiorari Lies to Review
the Ordinances of Municipal Councils in Arkansas, 8 ARK. L. BULL. 28 (1940).
68. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Railroad Commission, 109 Ark. 100, 106, 158 S.W.
1076, 1078 (1913).
69. 126 Ark. 125, 189 S.W. 1041 (1916).
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heard by the inferior tribunal."7 Its purpose was not to turn the review
by the circuit court into a trial de novo in which the court was free to
substitute its judgment for that of the Commission.
Hall v. Bledsoe naturally led subsequent courts to focus on the
process or method by which discharge was accomplished.7 1 If a public
body reached a decision to remove a particular officer or to discharge
an employee without going through a judicial type proceeding, then
certiorari was not available to review the decision. For example, in
McAllister v. McAllister,7 2 the court ruled that a resolution of the Fayetteville City Council removing the members of the civil service commission for malfeasance in office was not reviewable by certiorari since
the council had acted legislatively and not judicially. In the same year,
the court held in Jones v. Leighton7 1 that certiorari did lie to review a
resolution of the West Helena City Council finding that two improvement district commissioners had not subscribed to the statutory oath of
office. McAllister was distinguished on the grounds that the Fayetteville City Council acted legislatively whereas the West Helena City
Council acted quasi-judicially when it determined "as a matter of fact"
that the commissioners had not filed their oath of office. 74
Four years later, in Williams v. Dent,75 the Little Rock City
Council removed a water commissioner from office by resolution. The
commissioner sought review in the circuit court, which concluded that
it had no power to review the decision since the council had acted legislatively. The supreme court reversed on the grounds that the city council could under state law remove only "for cause" and the resolution
failed to state the grounds for removal. The opinion indicates that the
court was having second thoughts about its McAllister decision, which
in effect allowed a public body to insulate its decision from judicial
review by acting legislatively rather than judicially when it removed an
officer or discharged an employee.78
70. Id. at 135, 189 S.W. at 1043.
71. Warren v. McRae, 165 Ark. 436, 264 S.W. 940 (1924) (decision of state board of elections removing county election officials reviewed by certiorari); Carswell v. Hammock, 127 Ark.
110, 191 S.W. 935 (1917) (order of city council removing improvement district commissioners
reviewable by certiorari since council acted in quasi-judicial capacity).
72. 200 Ark. 171, 138 S.W.2d 1040 (1940).
73. 200 Ark. 1015, 142 S.W.2d 505 (1940).
74. Id. at 1019, 142 S.W.2d at 507.
75. 207 Ark. 440, 181 S.W.2d 29 (1944).
76. The court referred to its earlier opinion in McAllister as "inexact in that it seemingly
anchored final result upon a strict legal construction of the Council's power,and upon effect to be
given a resolution duly adopted, where, on the face of the resolution, statutory requirements,
prima facie, were complied with." Id. at 446, 181 S.W.2d at 32. Later cases involving judicial
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When the General Assembly established a Merit System Council
to review employee terminations by certain state agencies receiving federal funds, it did not expressly provide for judicial review of Council
decisions. In McCain v. Collins,77 the supreme court nonetheless applied Hall v. Bledsoe and held that review was available by certiorari
since the Council acted in a quasi-judicial capacity when it upheld the
action of a state agency in discharging an employee. Consistent with its
holding in Hall v. Bledsoe, the court restricted circuit court review to
questions of law, one of which was the legal sufficiency of the evidence
to support the decision of the Council, and stated that the judiciary
would encroach on the authority of another department of government
were it to substitute its own judgment for that of the Council.
Any suggestion in Hall v. Bledsoe or McCain v. Collins that
courts could not be empowered to review administrative discharges de
novo was soon laid to rest. In City Service Commission of Van Buren v.

Matlock ("Matlock

J/),78

a municipal civil service commission dis-

charged the chief of police pursuant to state civil service regulations
that provided for an "appeal ' 79 to circuit court in which the discharged
officer was entitled to a "trial de novo." The civil service commission
contended before the supreme court that the provision for an appeal
and a trial de novo before the circuit court was an attempt to vest the
court with "administrative" powers contrary to the separation of powers doctrine. The court concluded that if the legislature could provide
for judicial review of the commission's decision by certiorari, it could
likewise do so by appeal. It also saw no problem with providing for a
trial de novo before the circuit court since the "legislature had the
power to prescribe the mode of procedure on such appeal." 80 The dissent argued that any attempt to vest the circuit court with the power to
try the matter de novo violated separation of powers.
The court elaborated on the reasons for allowing the circuit court
to try the case de novo in a subsequent appeal of the same case ("Matreview of administrative discharges by certiorari include Martin v. Cogbill, 214 Ark. 818, 218
S.W.2d 94 (1949) and Fulmer v. Holcomb, 26lArk. 580, 550 S.W.2d 442 (1977).
77. 204 Ark. 521, 164 S.W.2d 448 (1942). See also Adams v. Cockrill, 227 Ark. 348, 298
S.W.2d 322 (1957). The Merit System Council is now called the Merit System Board. See ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-3901 to 12-3907 (Supp. 1983).
78. 205 Ark. 286, 168 S.W.2d 424 (1943).
79. Technically, the decision of a nonjudicial body cannot be appealed to a judicial body.
Prairie County v. Matthews, 46 Ark. 383, 386 (1885).
80. 205 Ark. at 289, 168 S.W.2d at 425. De novo review was subsequently applied in City of
Little Rock v. Newcomb, 219 Ark. 74, 239 S.W.2d 750 (1951); Petty v. City of Pine Bluff, 239
Ark. 49, 386 S.W.2d 935 (1965); Warwick v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of Malvern, 239 Ark. 674, 393
S.W.2d 616 (1965); and City of Little Rock v. Hall, 249 Ark. 337, 459 S.W.2d 119 (1970).
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lock I/'). 81 It stated that when the circuit court reviewed the commission's decision, "the whole matter was opened up for consideration by
the circuit court, as if a proceeding had been originally brought in that
forum." 82 This statement implies that determining whether sufficient
grounds exist to discharge an employee or remove a public official is a
hybrid function that can be vested either in a court or in a civil service
commission. If a court can be vested with original jurisdiction to consider the matter, it does not violate separation of powers to vest original
jurisdiction in a civil service commission but then subject the commission's decisions to de novo review by a court.
A recent decision by the court has called into question the holdings
in the Matlock cases. In Arkansas Livestock and Poultry Commission
v. House,83 an employee who was fired by a state agency following a
grievance hearing appealed his discharge to circuit court pursuant to
the Administrative Procedures Act.8 4 The supreme court ruled that the
discharge was not an appealable "adjudication" within the meaning of
the Administrative Procedures Act, but the language employed by the
courts may have implications for future cases in which review is sought
by writ of certiorari:
It seems too obvious for serious argument that the Administrative
Procedure Act, enacted in 1967, was never designed nor intended to
create supervisory responsibility by the judicial branch of state government over the day-to-day actions of the executive branch, including the hiring and firing of personnel, but rather, to establish procedures for hearings and notice (which meet due process requirements)
in those functions of the executive branch which are basically adjudicatory or quasi-judicial, particularly with respect to rule making, the
renewal or revocation of licenses, and where, under law, an agency of
the State must make orders based on the adjudication process. But it
is only in the judicial functions that the Administrative Procedure Act
purports to subject agency decisions to appellate review and then only
as narrowly prescribed in the act. (citations omitted) It hardly need
be said that firing employees is clearly an administrativeact and not
a matter that involves the quasi-judicialfunction of an agency. If
firing is subject to judicial review then we can think of no logical reason why hiring should not be also. And if hiring is, it follows that
81. 206 Ark. 1145, 178 S.W.2d 662 (1944).
82. Id. at 1150, 178 S.W.2d at 665. There was later a third appeal of the same case. City of
Van Buren v. Matlock, 208 Ark. 529, 186 S.W.2d 936 (1945).
83. 276 Ark. 236, 634 S.W.2d 388 (1982). See also Seiph v. Quapaw Vocational Technical
School, 278 Ark. 23, 643 S.W.2d 534 (1982).
84. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-701-715 (Supp. 1983).
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promotion would also come under our purview, and so on and on.85
In response to the employee's contention that the agency acted in a
quasi-judicial manner by appointing a fact-finding panel, giving written
notice to the employee, conducting a hearing, and making findings of
fact and conclusions of law, the court stated:
By giving the appellee the right to be heard on the issue of whether he
had violated the conditions of his probation, and by proceeding in a
quasi-judicial fashion, the agency did not thereby subject itself to judicial review of what was so clearly an administrative act.86
The reach of the court's opinion is uncertain. The ruling can be
read narrowly as an interpretation of the review available under the
Administrative Procedure Act. In other words, the employee should
have sought review by applying for a writ of certiorari pursuant to Act
88 of 1873 rather than by appealing pursuant to the Administrative
Procedures Act. But the court's language is much too broad to support
such a narrow reading. The opinion states that firing employees is an
administrative act that does not involve a quasi-judicial function of an
agency. Furthermore, the character of an act is not altered by the
agency's election to proceed in a quasi-judicial fashion when it decides
to discharge an employee. It is doubtful that House would have had
any greater success had he sought review by certiorari.
On the other hand, House should not be interpreted broadly to
mean that review by certiorari is no longer available following a quasijudicial proceeding that culminates in a decision to discharge an employee. If the court had intended to overrule Hall v. Bledsoe and its
progeny, it would surely have said so. House probably applies only
when there is no statutory requirement that a quasi-judicial proceeding
precede a decision to discharge. The General Assembly can provide by
statute for a quasi-judicial hearing prior to discharge, and it can further provide for judicial review of the decision that results from such
hearing.8 7 To paraphrase the court in Matlock I, if the General Assembly can provide for judicial review of administrative discharges by appeal, it can provide for judicial review by certiorari. Act 88 of 1873
probably creates a statutory right to judicial review of a decision to
discharge whenever a nonjudicial body is required by statute to conduct
a quasi-judicial proceeding prior to the discharge or removal and no
85. 276 Ark. at 329, 634 S.W.2d at 389 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 330, 634 S.W.2d at 390.
87. It has, for example, provided for review by appeal of a school board's decision to discharge a teacher. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1266.9(d) (Supp. 1983).
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alternative method of reviewing the decision is available.
Although not specifically addressed by the court in House, the
opinion may also influence future cases in which the issue is not the
availability of judicial review but the scope of judicial review. The
opinion seems to vindicate the dissenting justice in Matlock I, who argued that permitting the circuit court to try civil service appeals de
novo was an unconstitutional attempt to vest the court with administrative powers." If "firing employees is clearly an administrative act," it
would violate separation of powers to grant the circuit court original
jurisdiction to hear discharge proceedings. Separation of powers would
likewise preclude a scheme in which the circuit court, when reviewing
an administrative discharge, could try the matter de novo and substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency vested with authority to try discharge proceedings. 9
The fact that civil service commission determinations often involve
the exercise of discretion further supports the proposition that de novo
review of civil service commission determinations is unconstitutional.
No less an authority on administrative law than Professor Davis has
stated:
The reason for the holdings that nonjudicial functions may not be reviewed de novo is not that a court is lacking in qualification to make
findings of fact from conflicting evidence but that a court may be
lacking in qualification to take over the discretionary power. For instance, a typical civil service commission, which spends full time on
personnel problems, may be better qualified than a typical court to
exercise discretion on problems of personnel management, such as deciding whether to discharge, suspend, demote, reprimand, or warn a
public employee who is found guilty of misconduct.9 °
88. See note 79 and accompanying text.
89. Certiorari does not lie to review purely "administrative" acts. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Railroad Comm'n, 109 Ark. 100, 106, 158 S.W. 1076, 1078 (1913).
Courts in other states are split on the question whether de novo review of civil service decisions
violates separation of powers. Upholding de novo review statutes are Brady v. Pettit, 586 S.W.2d
29 (Ky. 1979); Weeks v. Personnel Bd. of Review of N. Kingstown, 118 R.I. 243, 373 A.2d 176
(1977); Matanuska-Susitna Borough v. Lum, 538 P.2d 994 (Alaska 1975); and Ex parte Darnell,
262 Ala. 71, 76 So. 2d 770 (1954). See also Francisco v. Board of Directors, 85 Wash.2d 575,
537 P.2d 789 (1975) and Osborne v. Bullitt County Board of Education, 415 S.W.2d 607 (Ky.
1967) (upholding de novo review of school board decisions to dismiss teachers). Attempts to provide for de novo review of personnel decisions were held to violate separation of powers in State ex
rel. McGinnis v. Police Civil Service Comm'n, 253 Minn. 62, 91 N.W.2d 154 (1958); City of
Meridian v. Davidson, 211 Miss. 683, 53 So. 2d 48 (1951); In re Fredericks, 285 Mich. 262, 280
N.W. 464 (1938); and City of Aurora v. Schoberlein, 230 Il1. 496, 82 N.E. 860 (1907).
90. 4 Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.10, at 185-86 (1958).
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But despite its broad language in House suggesting that courts
have no business supervising the hiring and firing of employees, the
Arkansas Supreme Court does not share the view that civil service decisions involve the exercise of discretion and that de novo review of
such decisions is therefore inappropriate. In its opinion in Goodall v.
Williams,91 which announced the "discretion" test for determining the
propriety of de novo review, the court also stated: "If the interests affected by administrative actions are constitutionally or statutorily preserved or preserved by private agreement, so that their enforcement is a
matter of right, de novo review by the judiciary of administrative decisions altering these interests is appropriate." 92 In support of this statement, the court cited Matlock II, which approved de novo review of
civil service commission determinations. Apparently, the court's view is
that a statute which provides that a person may be discharged only for
"cause" or some similar grounds does not leave room for exercise of
executive or legislative discretion. Instead, by limiting the grounds
under which a person may be discharged from public employment or
removed from public office, the legislature elevates that person's interest in his job or office tio
the status of a fixed statutory right.93 A person
may also have a "right" to his job or office pursuant to the Arkansas
Constitution 94 or an employment contract.9 When a statute or the constitution or a contract elevates a person's interest in his job or office to
the status of a "right", the termination or modification of that interest

by a civil service commission or similar body is no longer a matter involving the exercise of executive or legislative discretion, and de novo
judicial review is permissible.
The cases discussed thus far all involve situations in which a particular person is seeking something from the state or local government-money, a license, or a job-which is within the constitutional
power of the legislative department either to grant or withhold. If the
General Assembly chooses not to exercise that power directly, it has
considerable flexibility in the choice of the body to exercise the power.
It can select an administrative agency or other nonjudicial tribunal to
exercise the power, and it can confer on that agency the discretion to
91. 271 Ark. 354, 609 S.W.2d 25 (1980).
92. Id. at 356, 609 S.W.2d at 27.
93. Cf. Fulmer v. Holcomb, 261 Ark. 580, 550 S.W.2d 442 (1977); Williams v. Dent, 207
Ark. 440, 181 S.W.2d 29 (1944); Carswell v. Hammock, 127 Ark. 110, 191 S.W. 935 (1917);
Lucas v. Futrall, 84 Ark. 540, 106 S.W.2d 667 (1907).
94. See supra note 64.
95. A public employee can enforce an employment contract to the same extent as a private
employee. Cf Griffin v. Erickson, 227 Ark. 433, 642 S.W.2d 308 (1982).
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formulate public policy in the course of exercising the power. It can
insulate the agency's determinations from judicial review, or it can subject the agency's determination to judicial review, but it cannot authorize the courts to review de novo an agency determination that turns on
the exercise of executive or legislative discretion. On the other hand,
the General Assembly can elevate the interest of a particular person in
receiving or retaining money, or a license, or a job to the status of a
right. It can still use an administrative agency or other nonjudicial
body to determine whether the statutory prerequisites to the right have
been satisfied, but because the determination does not involve the exercise of executive or legislative discretion, separation of powers does not
preclude vesting the courts with original jurisdiction to make the determination or providing for de novo judicial review of a nonjudicial
determination.
IV.

CONTROVERSIES IN WHICH GOVERNMENT SEEKS
SOMETHING FROM A PARTICULAR PERSON

The second major category of cases or controversies to be considered are those in which government is seeking something from a particular person. These cases, like those in the first category, may involve
the exercise of legislative power, but there are constitutional limits on
the power of government to take property or money from a private person, and defining and enforcing those limits are judicial functions.
Thus, cases in the second category frequently necessitate defining the
proper roles of administrative agencies and the courts. When can the
General Assembly use an administrative agency to make determinations affecting the rights and liabilities of a particular person? To what
extent are such determinations subject to judicial review?
Eminent Domain

A.

Article II, section 23 of the Arkansas Constitution recognizes the
state's power of eminent domain, and according to the Arkansas Supreme Court, the power is vested in the legislative department of government.96 The exercise of the power of eminent domain involves two
determinations that may affect the rights and liabilities of a particular
person. First, a determination must be made that there is a public need
for the taking of specific private property. Second, a determination
must be made as to the appropriate compensation to be paid the owner
96.

Young v. City of Gurdon, 169 Ark. 399, 275 S.W. 890 (1925).
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of the property taken. These two determinations must be analyzed separately when defining the boundary between legislative and judicial
power.
Determining whether there is a public need to take specific property would appear to involve questions of public policy and the exercise
of legislative discretion. Under the cases discussed above, de novo judicial review of a legislative determination of public need would be unconstitutional. In an early, but frequently cited case, the Arkansas Supreme Court seemed to adopt such a view. The precise issue before the
court in Sloan v. Lawrence County9 was whether a landowner was entitled to notice and a hearing on the question of the necessity for taking
his property. The court concluded that he was not and that constitutional guarantees were satisfied so long as he received notice and a
hearing on the question of compensation. In its opinion the court characterized the determination of the necessity for condemnation as "a
political question to be exercised by the lawmakers."9' 8 The court also
endorsed the following statement from Cooley on ConstitutionalLimitations, which implies that there is no right to a judicial determination
of the necessity for condemnation:
On general principles, the final decision rests with the legislative department of the state; and, if the question is referred to any tribunal
for trial, the reference and the opportunity for being heard are matters of favor and not of right. The state is not under an obligation to
make provision for a judicial contest upon the question."
Sloan seems to say that determining the public need to condemn
specific property is a legislative function that need not be submitted for
judicial review. Prior to Sloan the court had on several occasions held
that the question of the need for a taking of private property could be
raised in a court of equity when the property owner charged that the
taking was a "fraudulent" attempt to condemn private property for private use under the guise of a taking for public use.10 0 Most of these
97. 134 Ark. 121, 203 S.W. 260 (1918).
98. Id. at 129, 203 S.W. at 262.
99. Id. at 128, 203 S.W. at 262 (quoting COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 777 (7th
Ed.)).
100. Mountain Park Terminal Ry. v. Field, 76 Ark. 239, 88 S.W. 897 (1905); Niemeyer &
Darragh v. Little Rock Junction Ry., 43 Ark. 11 (1884). In several other cases, the court reviewed the public use and purpose issue without discussion of the need to show fraud. Ozark Coal
Co. v. Pennsylvania Anthracite Ry., 97 Ark. 495, 134 S.W. 634 (1911) (whether property taken
for public use is a judicial question); Cloth v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 97 Ark. 86, 132 S.W. 1005
(1910) (whether property taken for public use is a judicial question); Gilbert v. Shaver, 91 Ark.
231, 120 S.W. 833 (1909); St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Petty, 57 Ark. 359, 21 S.W. 884 (1893).
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cases involved the exercise of eminent domain powers by private railway companies in which no governmental entity had verified that the
taking was for a public use. The court in Sloan was aware of these
cases, 10 1 but it is not clear that it considered them applicable to a case
where the legislative branch of government rather than a private corporation had determined the public need for a taking.102
Over the years the court retreated somewhat from its statement in
Sloan regarding judicial review of the necessity for taking private property. For example, in Woollard v. State Highway Commission,0 " in
response to the argument that a taking was not for a public purpose,
the court stated:
Although we have suggested that the legislative determination of the
necessity for taking is conclusive on the judiciary, Sloan v. Lawrence
County, [citations omitted], the view now prevailing makes the legislative judgment subject to review in cases of fraud, bad faith, or gross
abuse of discretion. .

.

.There being testimony by experienced engi-

neers that a 250-foot right-of-way is needed in this instance, the chancellor was correct in holding that the Commission's decision was not
arbitrary or capricious.1 04
Thus, the court in Woollard still considered the determination of the
necessity for taking to be a legislative function, but the courts would
review that determination in extraordinary cases to prevent an arbitrary or capricious abuse of legislative discretion. 0 5
In its more recent opinions, the court appears to have come a full
circle in its characterization of the power to determine the necessity for
taking private property. For example, in the 1976 case of Arkansas
State Highway Commission v. Alcott, 0 6 the court stated: "Whether or
101. The court in Sloan cited Mountain Park Terminal Ry. v. Field, 76 Ark. 239, 885 S.W.
897 (1905) and Niemeyer & Darragh v. Little Rock Junction Ry., 43 Ark. 111 (1884) in its
opinion.
102. At the close of its opinion in Sloan, the court made the following statement which
suggests that the cases cited supra note 100 were not applicable to a taking by a public entity:
"[A]II that has been said in this opinion has reference solely to condemnation for strictly public
uses in its broadest sense, and has no reference to condemnation for the benefit of private corporations exercising a public or quasi public function." 134 Ark. at 132, 203 S.W. at 263.
103. 220 Ark. 731, 249 S.W.2d 564 (1952).
104. Id. at 734, 249 S.W.2d at 566.
105. Compare Hogue v. Housing Authority of North Little Rock, 201 Ark. 263, 267, 144
S.W.2d 49, 52 (1940) ("Although courts have jurisdiction to determine what constitutes a public
use as distinguished from a private use, or vice versa, yet in so doing it [sic] gives great weight to
the declaration of the Legislature concerning nature of the Act.").
106. 260 Ark. 225, 539 S.W.2d 432 (1976). See also Dowling v. Erickson, 278 Ark. 142, 644
S.W.2d 264 (1983).
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not a proposed use for which private property is taken is for a public or
private use is a judicial question which the owner has a right to have
' 10 7
determined by the courts."
While the court's language has not always been as precise as it
could be, its holdings over the years regarding the character of the
power to determine the public need to take private property are reconcilable. Determining the "public need" for a taking can refer to two
distinct questions. First, it may refer to the wisdom of undertaking a
particular public project. Is it really in the interest of the public to
build the road, or the power line, or the levee in question? Determining
the public interest lies within the province of the legislative branch, or
the administrative agency to which the legislature delegates the power
to determine the public interest. 10 8 Because the decision involves the
exercise of legislative discretion, a court would encroach on legislative
prerogatives if it substituted its judgment of the public interest for that
of the decisionmaker.
Second, determining the "public need" for a taking may refer to
the question whether private property is really being taken for a public
as opposed to a private purpose. Article II, section 22 of the Arkansas
Constitution states: "The right of property is before and higher than
any constitutional sanction; and private property shall not be taken, appropriated or damaged for public use, without just compensation therefor." This provision prohibits a taking of private property except for
public use. 10 9 When a court reviews a legislative determination that
particular property is being taken for a public purpose, it must independently confirm that the property is actually being taken for a public
and not a private purpose. Otherwise, the court abdicates one of the
most basic judicial powers-the power to interpret the constitution and
ensure compliance with that interpretation by the executive and legislative departments.11 0 If the court does not consider de novo a landowner's contention that his property is being taken for a private purpose, then the condemning agency is in a position to make factual
107. 260 Ark. at 226, 539 S.W.2d at 433. There was dictum to the same effect in City of
Little Rock v. Raines, 241 Ark. 1071, 411 S.W.2d 486 (1967) (holding that Amendment 49 to
Constitution did not authorize city to take private property for use as industrial park).
108. If Parkin Printing & Stationery Co. v. Arkansas Printing & Lithographing Co., 234
Ark. 697, 354 S.W.2d 560 (1962) is correct in holding that the State Highway Commission is a
part of the executive department, then the power to determine the public need for building a state
highway is executive in character.
109. Robinson v. Arkansas State Game and Fish Comm'n, 263 Ark. 462, 565 S.W.2d 433
(1978); Cloth v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 97 Ark. 86, 132 S.W. 1005 (1910).
110. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 26 (1803).
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determinations that define the constitutional limits on exercise of the

power of eminent domain.11
The true distinction between legislative power and judicial power

in connection with the determination of public use becomes apparent in
those cases where it is conceded that the taking is for a public use but
there is a dispute as to exactly which property or how much property
should be taken to satisfy that use. In such a case, there are no "consti111. The notion that certain factual determinations by an administrative agency must be
decided independently by the court was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920), in which a public utility
argued that a rate order issued by the state public utility commission "confiscated" its property
contrary to the due process clause. The highest state court refused to exercise its "independent
judgment" on the question. The Supreme Court reversed, stating:
[I]f the owner claims confiscation of his property will result, the State must provide a
fair opportunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon
its own independent judgment as to both law and facts; otherwise the order is void
because in conflict with the due process clause, Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 289.
The "constitutional fact" doctrine is discussed in detail in Larson, The Doctrine of "Constitutional Fact", 15 TEMP. L.Q. 185 (1941).
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), which involved the constitutionality of a statute that
vested an administrative agency with the power to make factual determinations related to the
compensation of employees for work-related injuries incurred upon the navigable waters of the
United States, established the proposition that there must be independent judicial review of facts
which are "jurisdictional" in the sense that their existence is a prerequisite to the exercise of
legislative power:
These fundamental requirements (in this case) are that the injury occur upon the navigable waters of the United States and that the relation of master and servant exist.
These conditions are indispensable to the application of the statute, not only because
Congress has so provided explicitly, but also because the power of the Congress to enact
the legislation turns upon the existence of these conditions.
Id. at 54.
The distinction between the "constitutional fact" doctrine of Ben Avon and the "jurisdictional
fact" doctrine of Crowell v. Benson is that the former is based on the due process clause while the
latter is related to separation of powers considerations. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 639 (1965). Because exercise of the legislative power of eminent domain is subject to the constitutional requirement that a taking be for a public use, it is probably the "jurisdictional fact" doctrine that requires independent judicial determination of the public use question.
On the other hand, both doctrines appear to require an independent judicial determination of the
value of the property taken. It may be that in certain situations it is impossible to distinguish
"constitutional facts" from "jurisdictional facts." See Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determinationsof Questions of "ConstitutionalFact," 80 U. PA. L. REv.
1055, 1077-82 (1932).
It should be noted that not everyone agrees that the doctrines of "constitutional fact" and
"jurisdictional fact" apply to the review of factual determinations by Arkansas administrative
agencies. According to Wilson & Carnes, supra note 16, at 398, the status of the "constitutional
fact" doctrine in Arkansas is unclear. Professor Covington questions whether the "jurisdictional
fact" holding of Crowell v. Benson applies to judicial review of factual determinations by the
Arkansas Workmen's Compensation Commission (now the Workers' Compensation Commission).
See Covington, supra note 16, at 142.
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tutional facts" or "jurisdictional facts" that must be independently confirmed by the courts. 112 Because the choice of the route or the size of a
right of way easement involves the exercise of legislative discretion, the
courts will not disturb the legislative determination as to route and size
unless that determination was arbitrary and capricious."'
The appropriate allocation of powers between the courts and nonjudicial bodies has also arisen in connection with the determination of
the amount of compensation to be paid the owner whose property is
taken pursuant to exercise of the power of eminent domain. When private property is taken by a private corporation with eminent domain
powers, such as a railroad or public utility, article XII, section 9 of the
Arkansas Constitution gives the owner the right to have the question of
compensation "ascertained by a jury of twelve men, in a court of competent jurisdiction." Consequently, regardless of any division of powers
between the legislative and judicial branches mandated by article IV,
the courts and not an administrative agency must decide the compensation question in a case covered by article 12, section 9.
The constitutional right to a trial by jury on the issue of compensation is not applicable, however, when the taking is by a public entity. 14 Article II, section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution, which is set
out above,' 1 5 guarantees the landowner the right to an eventual judicial
confirmation that the compensation paid for his property is "just," but
neither the separation of powers article or nor any other constitutional
provision precludes the legislature from using an administrative agency
to make an initial determination of the amount of compensation to be
paid the person whose property is taken by eminent domain.
One of the few cases in which the Arkansas Supreme Court has
addressed in any detail the character of the power to determine the
compensation to be paid when private property is taken for public use
112. Cf Railway Company v. Petty, 57 Ark. 359, 21 S.W. 884 (1893). "When once the
character of the use is found to be public, the court's inquiry ends, and the legislative policy is left
supreme, although it appears that private ends will be advanced by the public user." Id. at 365, 21
S.W. at 885.
113. State Highway Comm'n v. Saline County, 205 Ark. 860, 171 S.W.2d 60 (1943); Patterson Orchard Co. v. Southwest Arkansas Utilities Corp., 179 Ark. 1029, 18 S.W.2d 1028 (1929).
See also City of Little Rock v. Raines, 241 Ark. 1071, 411 S.W.2d 486 (1967); State Game and
Fish Comm'n v. Hornaday, 219 Ark. 184, 187, 242 S.W.2d 342, 344 (1951) ("The Commission
determines what property is needed, and if its actions do not constitute an abuse of discretion
courts will not interfere.").
114. Dickerson v. Tri-County Drainage Dist., 138 Ark. 471, 212 S.W. 334 (1919); Young v.
Red Fork Levee Dist., 124 Ark. 61, 186 S.W. 604 (1916).
115. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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was Town of Hoxie v. Gibson.116 The case involved a statute which
provided for the appointment of three appraisers by the circuit court to
determine the damages resulting from the opening of a city street
through private property. The finding of the appraisers as to the value
of the property taken was conclusive and nonappealable. The supreme
court rejected the assertion by the municipality that the General Assembly could constitute a board of appraisers and delegate to such
board the absolute power, free from judicial review, to determine the
value of the condemned property:
The Legislature undoubtedly has the power to determine whether
the necessity exists for such condemnation, but it has no power to
create a tribunal and vest it with absolute authority to condemn private property without just compensation, or upon such compensation
as such tribunal may determine, and make the finding of that tribunal
or board conclusive upon the issue of compensation. The jurisdiction
to determine the necessity for condemnation is one thing. That is
purely a legislative function which the Legislature may exercise untrammeled. The jurisdiction to determine the value of the land condemned and the compensation to be rendered the owner therefore is
another thing. The latter power is purely a judicialfunction, which
none but the courts can exercise. If the Legislature designates a tribunal other than a common-law jury to ascertain the value of the
land and the amount of compensation to be paid the owner therefor,
then the finding of such tribunal on the issues offact must be subject
to review by the courts. The right of appeal from such finding through
to the court of last resort cannot be taken away. Article 7, § 4, Const.
Ark. If this procedure is not followed, then the landowner is deprived
of his property without judicial inquiry, i.e., without the due process
guaranteed by our Constitution and the Constitution of the United
11 7
States.
The opinion is somewhat confusing. It characterizes determination
of the value of condemned property as "purely a judicial function,
which none but the courts can exercise." But the real defect in the
statute under consideration was its attempt to make the findings of the
nonjudicial body conclusive on the courts. The emphasized language in
the quotation suggests that the court would not have objected to the
use of a nonjudicial tribunal to determine the value of condemned
property provided the determination was subject to judicial review.
Assuming for purposes of argument that determining the value of
116.
117.

155 Ark. 338, 245 S.W. 332 (1922).
Id. at 343, 245 S.W. at 333 (emphasis added).
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condemned property is a purely judicial function, separation of powers
does not bar the use of an administrative agency to make such determinations. The United States Supreme Court has held, by analogy to the
use of masters and commissioners, that administrative agencies can,
consistent with the separation of powers doctrine, act as fact-finding
adjuncts of the courts.118 The Arkansas Supreme Court has implicitly
approved the practice of using a group of citizens, variously called "appraisers", "viewers", or "arbitrators", to set the damages payable in a
condemnation proceeding.1 19 If an ad hoc group of citizens can act as a
fact-finding adjunct of a court in a condemnation proceeding, an administrative agency should be able to perform the same role.12 0 The
procedure would not diminish the judicial powers of the courts. The
factual determination of the agency would be subject to judicial review,
and the scope of judicial review would not be limited to determining
whether there was substantial evidence to support the agency's determination. As discussed above, the power of eminent domain is subject
to constitutional limits. Not only must the taking be "for public use";
the owner must receive "just compensation."1'21 The value of condemned property is a "constitutional fact."' 2 Consequently, the value
of condemned property fixed by an administrative agency must be subject to independent judicial determination at some stage of the condemnation proceeding to ensure agency compliance with constitutional limits on the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
It is interesting to note that although the owner whose property is
condemned has a right to an independent judicial determination of the
value of the property, the right is waived if not asserted in a timely
fashion. In Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. State Highway Commission s an owner whose land had been appropriated by the State High118. See infra note 231 and the accompanying text for the quotation from Crowell v. Benson.
119. Smith v. Marianna, 89 Ark. 48, 115 S.W. 938 (1909); St. Francis Levee District v.
Redditt, 79 Ark. 159, 95 S.W. 482 (1906); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Royall, 75 Ark. 530, 88
S.W. 555 (1905). Cf. Cairo & Fulton Ry. v. Trout, 37 Ark. 17 (1877). See ARK. R. Civ. P. 53
(authorizing court to appoint referee, auditor, examiner, commissioner or assessor); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 34-1815 (1962) (authorizing court to appoint commissioners in partition action); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 62-603 (1971) (authorizing clerk of court to appoint commissioners to lay off homestead); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-711 (1971) (authorizing probate court to appoint commissioners to
lay off dower).
120. This assumes that separation of powers does not require that the fact-finding adjunct be
a part of the judicial department.
121. ARK. CONST. art. 1I,
§ 22.
122. See supra note 11I for discussion of "constitutional facts" and "jurisdictional facts."
123. 194 Ark. 616, 108 S.W.2d 1077 (1937). See also Tri-B Advertising v. Arkansas State
Highway Comm'n, 260 Ark. 227, 539 S.W.2d 430 (1976); Bryant v. Arkansas State Highway
Comm'n, 233 Ark. 41, 342 S.W.2d 415 (1961); Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Bush, 195
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way Commission recovered a judgment against the Commission which
remained uncollected on the date that the supreme court rendered its
decision in Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Nelson Brothers.12 4 The effect of the decision in Nelson Brothers was to void the
judgment. The owner then sued the Commission to enjoin further trespass on his land. In holding that relief should be denied, the supreme
court announced the following rule:
Appellant had, therefore, the right to prohibit the Highway Commission, or any other agency of government, from taking its property until compensation had been paid. . . .But, if the property owner fails
to assert this right and permits the State to take and occupy his property before compensating him, he may not thereafter coerce compensation by retaking the property from the possession of the State. He
must thereafter trust the State to deal fairly with its citizens. He then
has no other remedy. "
The moral seems clear. The owner who permits the state or its
agencies to take and occupy his land without first compensating him
cannot thereafter sue the state to obtain a judicial determination of the
amount compensation to which he is entitled.12 6 Such a suit would be
one against the state, prohibited by the sovereign immunity provision.
The landowner's only remedy is to seek relief from the State Claims
Commission. 2 7 Thus, through his own inaction, a landowner can convert what was a judicial question into a legislative question.
B.

Zoning

The Arkansas Supreme Court has also encountered difficulty
drawing the line between legislative power and judicial power in zoning
cases. Because zoning applies prospectively to a broad group of persons,
it involves the exercise of legislative power, even under the narrow definition of legislative power used in Ozarks. The power has been delegated by the General Assembly to municipal governments since 1924128
Ark. 920, 114 S.W.2d 1061 (1938).
124. 191 Ark. 629, 87 S.W.2d 394 (1955).
125. 194 Ark. at 619, 108 S.W.2d at 1078-79.
126. To protect his right to a judicial determination on the issues of damages, the owner
must require the State Highway Commission to deposit funds with the court. The procedure is
described in Arkansas State Highway Comm'n v. Partain, 192 Ark. 127, 131-32, 90 S.W.2d 968,
970 (1936).
127. In Roesler v. Denton, 239 Ark. 462, 463, 390 S.W.2d 98, 99 (1965), the court stated
that were it not for the relief available from the Claims Commission, the rule might violate due
process.
128. 1924 Ark. Acts 6 (Third Extraordinary Session). Present statutory authority for munici-
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and to county governments since 1937.129 The courts have traditionally
subjected zoning ordinances to closer judicial scrutiny than other types
of county or municipal legislation, and this tendency toward "judicial
zoning" has sometimes led to separation of powers problems."' 0 In 1965
the General Assembly enacted a statute allowing appeals of all final
zoning actions to circuit court, "wherein the same shall be tried de
novo according to the same procedure which applies to appeals in civil
actions from decisions of inferior courts, including the right of trial by
jury."' 1 This statute, which according to one commentator "virtually
transfers the zoning power from cities to the courts", 132 was applied in
three cases without its constitutionality being questioned. 33 But in
Wenderoth v. City of Fort Smith,1 3 1 the court ruled:
By this method of appellate review de novo there is attempted to impose upon the circuit court a function of a nonjudicial character in a
matter that is exclusively within the discretion and legitimate power
of the city's legislative body. The result would be to substitute the
judgment of the circuit court for that of a municipal law-making
body. This is contrary to Article 4 of our constitution which prohibits
135
intrusion by the judiciary upon the legislative domain.
The court further held that a reviewing court was limited to determining whether a zoning ordinance was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, which is the standard of review applicable generally to legislative
acts.
The reasoning in Wenderoth is very similar to that in Goodall v.
Williams. Zoning, like licensing, involves the exercise of legislative discretion. It is not surprising that the opinion Goodall v. Williams cited
Wenderoth for the proposition that de novo review is inappropriate "if
the interests affected are less than fixed and determined and their exis' 136
tence depends primarily upon executive or legislative wisdom."
In a footnote in Wenderoth the court stated that it was not passing
pal zoning is found at ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-2804 to 19-2806 (1980).
129. 1937 Ark. Acts 246. Present statutory authority for county zoning is found at ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1107 to 17-1117 (1980 and Supp. 1983).
130. The tendency of the courts to subject zoning actions to particularly close review is criticized in Gitelman, Judicial Review of Zoning Action in Arkansas, 23 ARK. L. REV. 22 (1969).
131. 1965 Ark. Acts 134, codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-2830.1 (1980).
132. Gitelman, supra note 130, at 41.
133. Wright v. City of Little Rock, 245 Ark. 355, 432 S.W.2d 488 (1968); Arkansas Power
& Light Co. v. City of Little Rock, 243 Ark. 290, 420 S.W.2d 85 (1967); City of Little Rock v.
Leawood Property Owners Ass'n, 242 Ark. 451, 413 S.W.2d 877 (1967).
134. 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971).
135. Id. at 345, 472 S.W.2d at 75.
136. 271 Ark. at 356, 609 S.W.2d at 27.
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on the constitutionality of the de novo review statute as applied to actions by a city council or other body in an "administrative or quasijudicial capacity."1 "7 The statement presumably refers to action on a
request for relief from application of a zoning ordinance. Under Arkansas law, a property owner can apply to the municipal or county board
of adjustment for an area variance (permission to deviate from lot size
or set back restrictions because of circumstances unique to the particular property), but boards of adjustment cannot grant a use variance
(permission to deviate from a restriction on the use of the property). 1 8
Decisions by a board of adjustment on a request for variance are appealed directly to circuit court. 139 The property owner who wants to use
his property for a purpose not permitted by the zoning ordinance must
apply to the county or city planning commission to rezone the property. 40 Decisions of the planning commission are reviewed by the
county quorum court or city council, and the action of the quorum
court or council is appealable to circuit court.1 " Since Wenderoth involved judicial review of a rezoning ordinance, the court probably had
in mind decisions of the board of adjustment granting or denying a
request for an area variance when it referred to actions in an "administrative or quasi-judicial capacity."
This conclusion is buttressed by two decisions handed down on the
same date in 1979, in which the court drew a distinction between de
novo review of city council action on a request for rezoning and board
of adjustment action on the request for a variance. In Taylor v. City of
Little Rock, 4 2 which involved an appeal from a decision of the, Little
Rock City Board of Directors denying a rezoning request, the court
applied its Wenderoth ruling and held that the reviewing court "does
not try a city zoning decision de novo but, instead, determines whether
the city's action was arbitrary."""' In City of Paragouldv. Leath,", in
discussing an appeal from a decision of a municipal board of adjust137. Id. at 347, 472 S.W.2d at 76, n.L
138. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1113(7.7), 19-2829(b) (1980). The distinction between an
"area variance" and a "use variance" is discussed in Wright, Zoning Law in Arkansas: A Comparative Analysis, 3 UALR L.J. 421, 448-50 (1980).
139. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1113(7.8), 17-1115 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-2829(b),
19-2830.1 (1980).
140. Both county and municipal boards of adjustments are specifically prohibited from permitting any use in a zone that is not permitted by the zoning ordinance. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 171113(7.7), 19-2829(b) (1980).
141. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-1112(6.1), 19-2830(1) (1980).
142. 266 Ark. 384, 583 S.W.2d 72 (1979).
143. Id. at 388, 583 S.W.2d at 74.
144. 266 Ark. 390, 583 S.W.2d 72 (1979).
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ment on a request for a variance, the court stated:
In spite of the language of Wenderoth v. City of Fort Smith, ...
the
act here which provides for appeals from the Board of Adjustment is
not subject to those constitutional limitations applicable to City Council actions in zoning because the Board of Adjustment acts administratively, not legislatively."1 5
Although the precise issue before the court was not the constitutionality of de novo review of board of adjustment decisions, the language is
consistent with the footnote in Wenderoth if it means that de novo review of such decisions is constitutional.
The basis for distinguishing city council action on a request to rezone from board of adjustment action on a request for an area variance
is not clear. One wonders whether the court would have drawn the
same distinction if Arkansas law provided for city council review of
decisions by the board of adjustment, or if boards of adjustment were
empowered to grant use variances. It oversimplifies the problem to assume that city councils always act in a legislative capacity. In dealing
with discharges and removals, the court has recognized that a city
council can act in a quasi-judicial capacity when discharging an employee or removing an officer.146 It is likewise possible that a city council acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when it hears rezoning requests. In
fact, courts in other jurisdictions have held that while the initial adoption of a zoning ordinance by a legislative body constitutes an exercise
of legislative power that is subject to limited judicial review, a determination by the same legislative body changing the permissible use of
specific property is quasi-judicial in character and subject to closer judicial scrutiny. 14 7 These other courts draw a distinction between those
actions that affect the use of all property in an area (zoning ordinances) and those that affect the use of specific property under an existing zoning scheme (rezoning ordinances and variances). Although
145. Id. at 393, 583 S.W.2d at 77.
146. See Jones v. Leighton, 200 Ark. 1015, 142 S.W.2d 505 (1940). Cf. Williams v. Dent,
207 Ark. 440, 181 S.W.2d 29 (1944).
147. Cooper v. Bd. of Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980);
Lowe v. City of Missoula, 165 Mont. 38, 525 P.2d 551, 554 (1974); Fasano v. Bd. of County
Commissioners of Washing County, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Fleming v. City of Tacoma,
81 Wash.2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972). See also Booth, A Realistic Reexamination of Rezoning
Procedure: The Complimentary Requirements of Due Process and Judicial Review, 10 GA. L.
REV. 753, 772 (1976). Other courts agree with the Arkansas Supreme Court that action on a
request for rezoning is legislative in character. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 399 So. 2d 1179
(La. App. 1981); American Beauty Homes Corporation v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 379 S.W.2d 450 (1964).
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use of a general applicability versus specific applicability test to distinguish legislative action from judicial action finds some support in the
language of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Ozarks, the Arkansas
court has not applied the test in zoning cases. Instead, it treats rezoning ordinances, but not actions on a request for a variance, as the exercise of legislative power.
The only clue as to why the court treats a request for rezoning
differently from a request for a variance is found in Leath. In Leath the
court stated that the board acts "administratively, not legislatively."
The court may have had in mind a line of cases which distinguish legislative acts of a city council, which are subject to referendum, from administrative acts of the council, which are not.1 48 The fact that governmental action is not subject to referendum does not necessarily mean
that it may be subjected to do novo judicial review. Moreover, even
assuming that the board of adjustment acts "administratively" when it
rules on a request for a variance, it is unclear why such a characterization makes de novo review appropriate. In the context of discharges of
public employees and removals of public officers, the court has used the
term "administrative" to refer to those actions of a city council or other
body that are not subject to judicial review. The test for judicial review
applied in the certiorari cases was "whether the act sought to be reviewed is done in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, and not merely
in a legislative, executive, or administrative capacity." '14 9 In the House
opinion, the court characterized firing an employee as "clearly an administrative act and not a matter that involves the quasi-judicial function of the agency. '1 50 But in Leath, the fact that the board of adjustment acted "administratively, and not legislatively" apparently meant
that de novo judicial review was appropriate.
If Goodall v. Williams is any guide, the propriety of de novo judicial review of a zoning decision turns not on the character of the body
making the decision (the city council versus the board of adjustment)
nor on whether the decision is legislative, administrative, or quasi-judicial. The correct test is whether the zoning decision under review involves the exercise of legislative discretion. If so, then the courts encroach upon the legislative domain when they substitute their own
judgment for that of the body to which the General Assembly has dele148. Cochran v. Black, 240 Ark. 393, 400 S.W.2d 280 (1966); Scroggins v. Kerr, 217 Ark.
137, 228 S.W.2d 995 (1950).
149. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Railroad Comm'n, 109 Ark. 100, 106, 158 S.W. 1076,
1078 (1913).
150. 276 Ark. at 329, 634 S.W.2d at 388.

320
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gated legislative discretion to determine the public interest.
When a city council enacts a zoning ordinance, it is exercising legislative discretion conferred by the General Assembly. The same can be
said of a city council's action on a rezoning request. Thus, the court
was correct in holding that such decisions are not subject to de novo
review. Determining whether a board of adjustment has similar discretion to grant or deny a request for an area variance is more difficult. A
board of adjustment is empowered to hear requests for variances "from
the literal provisions of the zoning ordinance in instances where strict
enforcement of the zoning ordinances would cause undue hardship due
to circumstances unique to the individual property under consideration."1'51 The board is to grant such requests "only when it is demonstrated that such action will be in keeping with the spirit and intent of
provisions of the zoning ordinance. ' 152 The "undue hardship" language
makes it a close question. The test is not unlike the "cause" standard
that makes it possible for the courts to review civil service commission
decisions de novo. But on balance, the statute seems to contemplate
that the board may exercise some discretion in determining whether to
grant a variance. The interest of a property owner in relief from strict
compliance with the zoning ordinance in circumstances of "undue
hardship," unlike the interest of a public employee in not being fired
except for "cause," has not been elevated by the General Assembly to
the status of a statutory right. Consequently, de novo review of board
1 53
of adjustment decisions is inappropriate.
C.

Taxation

Taxation is another area in which the line between legislative
power and judicial power is sometimes nebulous. The Arkansas Constitution grants broad powers to the legislative branch in the area of taxation. Article II, section 23 vests the state's power of taxation in the
General Assembly. Article XVI, section 5, as amended by amendment
59, provides that all real and personal property shall be subject to taxation according to its value, "that value to be ascertained in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, making the same equal and
uniform throughout the State."
A taxpayer may challenge the value at which his property is as151. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1113(7.7(2)) and 19-2829(b)(2) (1980).
152. Id.
153. De novo judicial review of action on a request for a variance was held to violate the
Georgia Constitution's separation of powers clause in Bentley v. Chastain, 242 Ga. 348, 249
S.E.2d 38 (1978).
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sessed for purposes of imposing ad valorem property taxes or contend
that an assessment by a local improvement district is disproportionate
to the benefits conferred on his property by the improvement. If the
rule of Ozarks were applied literally, such disputes could not be resolved by an administrative agency since their resolution necessitates a
determination of present or past facts affecting the liability of the taxpayer. But the power to determine the value of property for purposes of
ad valorem property taxes, as well as the power to determine special
improvement assessments, has traditionally been regarded as purely a
legislative power that can be delegated by the legislature to the county
board of equalization or to the commissioners of an improvement district.1 54 In fact, some early cases suggest that exercise of the power by
the assessing body is not subject to judicial review except as provided
by statute. The following statement appears in Clay County v. Brown
Lumber Co.:155
When legislation, in accomplishing the necessities of government,
makes provision that certain officers or boards shall fix the assessment
of property, it does not violate the right of due process of law. Now
while, ordinarily, appeal is granted from such officer or board to some
court or board of revision, yet, when such boards of equalization are
properly constituted, there is no appealfrom their decision in simple
matters of judgment or opinion as to values, unless appeal is specifl154. Real and personal property tax assessments are initially fixed by the county assessor and
equalized throughout the county by the County Board of Equalization, which is a nonjudicial
body. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-708 (1980). Decisions of the Board of Equalization are reviewed by
the county court, which acts in an administrative capacity and not a judicial capacity when it
equalizes assessments. Burton v. Harris, 202 Ark. 696, 705, 152 S.W.2d 529, 533 (1941); Missouri P. R.R. Co. v. Izard County Highway Improvement Dist. No. 1, 143 Ark. 261, 268, 220
S.W. 452, 454 (1920). Decisions of the county court are appealable to circuit court pursuant to
art. VII, § 33 of the constitution.
The power of the board of commissioners of a special improvement district to fix assessments
in proportion to the benefit conferred also represents the exercise of legislative power. The seminal
case in this area seems to be Coffman v. St. Francis Drainage Dist., 83 Ark. 54, 103 S.W. 179
(1907), in which the court held that the only question reviewable by the court was whether an
assessment was "such an arbitrary abuse of the taxing power as would amount to a confiscation of
property . . . without any benefit whatsoever." See also McCord v. Welch, 147 Ark. 362, 227
S.W. 765 (1921); Burr v. Beaver Dam Drainage Dist., 145 Ark. 51, 223 S.W. 362 (1920); Monette Rd. Improvement Dist. v. Dudley, 144 Ark. 59, 222 S.W. 59 (1920); Bush v. Delta Rd.
Improvement Dist. of Lee County, 141 Ark. 247, 216 S.W. 690 (1919). The circuit court acts in a
judicial capacity and not an administrative capacity when it reviews special improvement district
assessments. Missouri P. R.R. Co. v. Conway County Bridge Dist., 134 Ark. 292, 204 S.W. 630
(1918).
155. 90 Ark. 413, 119 S.W. 251 (1909). See also Wells Fargo & Co. Express v. Crawford
County, 63 Ark. 576, 40 S.W. 710 (1897).
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cally provided for by statute."6
The following year, the court issued State v. Little,15 in which the Arkansas Attorney General and State Tax Commission sought an injunction to prevent the County Court of Miller County from reducing certain assessments. In affirming the dismissal of the complaint for want
of equity, the supreme court quoted article XVI, section 5 of the constitution, which, as indicated above, provides that the value of property
subject to taxation is "to be ascertained in such manner as the General
Assembly shall direct," and then stated:
Hence it will be seen that the taxing power is a legislative function,
and that, subject to constitutional restrictions, the action of the Legislature is supreme. . . . The Legislature having provided the agencies
for the assessment of property for taxation and the manner of its exercise, the action of such officers is conclusive on the state in the absence of a statute to the contrary; and the courts have no power to
supervise and correct the assessments made by them.15'
State v. Little was subsequently cited in a number of cases for the
statement that "courts are powerless to give relief against erroneous
judgments of assessing bodies, except as they are especially empowered
by law to do so.''"1

These statements do not necessarily mean that the General Assembly can make the determinations of assessing bodies conclusive on the
courts. Most of the cases involved collateral attacks in chancery court
on the judgments of assessing bodies. The holdings of the cases can be
justified on the narrower grounds that the taxpayer should have appealed his assessment to circuit court as allowed by law. In Jensen v.
Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 60 the tax assessor made additional assessments against the taxpayer after the time within which the taxpayer
could challenge the assessment before the board of equalization and
county court. The supreme court held that a court of equity could grant
relief from the assessment since the taxpayer obviously had no remedy
at law against the illegal act of the assessor. The implication of the
holding is that the statements in State v. Little and later cases to the
156. 90 Ark. at 417, 119 S.W. at 252 (emphasis added).
157. 94 Ark. 217, 126 S.W. 713 (1910).
158. Id. at 219-21, 126 S.W. at 714 (emphasis added).
159. Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. Clark County Bd. of Equalization, 136 Ark. 180, 184, 206
S.W. 70, 71 (1918); Arlington Hotel Co. v. Buchanan, 110 Ark. 34, 160 S.W. 895 (1913); State
v. Kansas City & M. Ry. & Bridge Co., 106 Ark. 248, 251, 153 S.W. 614, 617 (1913); Clay
County v. Bank of Knobel, 105 Ark. 450, 453, 151 S.W. 1013, 1014 (1912).
160. 209 Ark. 262, 190 S.W.2d 5 (1945).
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effect that courts are powerless to grant relief from erroneous assessments are overly broad and that courts of equity do have jurisdiction to
correct erroneous assessments when no provision is made for review by
a court of law.1 61
The quotations set out above are also less than accurate to the
extent they indicate that the availability of judicial review of the action
of assessing bodies depends on express statutory authority. Pursuant to
article VII, section 29 of the Arkansas Constitution, the county court
'
has exclusive jurisdiction "in all matters relating to county taxes." 162
A
taxpayer who disagrees with the value at which his property is assessed
for purposes of ad valorem property taxes is entitled to county court
review of the action of the board of equalization or any similar administrative body to which the legislature delegates the power to equalize
assessments. Article VII, section 33 grants a right to appeal a decision
of the county court to circuit court. The right of appeal extends to actions of the county court taken in an administrative capacity as well as
in a judicial capacity. 6" Consequently, even in the absence of a statute
expressly providing for judicial review of the action of the board of
equalization, the taxpayer who claims that his property has been overvalued for assessment purposes is constitutionally entitled to circuit
court review of his claim.
Assuming that judicial review of the action of assessing bodies is
available, the scope of that review is probably limited by separation of
powers. Because determining the value of property for purposes of ad
valorem property taxes or fixing the amount of assessments for special
improvements represents the exercise of purely legislative power, a reviewing court cannot constitutionally be empowered to substitute its
judgment for that of the assessing body. In St. Louis-San Francisco
Railway Co. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission,"" the court
dealt with a statute which purported to authorize a de novo trial in
161. In Raef v. Radio Broadcasting, Inc., 209 Ark. 253, 190 S.W.2d 1 (1945), which was
handed down the same day as Jensen v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., the court ordered an equitable action dismissed because the assessment was made within the statutory period and the taxpayer could have appealed the assessment to circuit court.
A court of equity has jurisdiction under ARK. CONST. art. II, § 23 to enjoin an illegal exaction,
but a taxpayer who seeks to enjoin an illegal exaction must do more than merely assert that his
assessment is too high. He must contend that the tax is unconstitutional, that the property is not
subject to taxation under the applicable statutes, or that he is not the person charged with payment of the tax. See infra note 179.
162. Burgess v. Four States Memorial Hospital, 250 Ark. 485, 465 S.W.2d 693 (1971).
163. Barker v. Wist, 163 Ark. 511, 512, 260 S.W. 408 (1924); Horn v. Baker 140 Ark. 168,
173, 2i5 S.W. 600, 602 (1919).
164. 227 Ark. 1066, 304 S.W.2d 297 (1957).
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circuit court when a public utility appealed an order of the Arkansas
Public Service Commission fixing the value of the utility's property for
ad valorem assessment purposes. The court held that the statute did
not contemplate a de novo trial similar to the de novo trial available in
an appeal from a justice of the peace court to circuit court since a
court has no power under the constitution to fix assessments. Instead,
"the purpose of any Court appeal from an assessment or equalizing
agency is to see that the assessment is neither erroneous in figures, nor
arbitrary in measuring, nor confiscatory in results."1 5 The court also
quoted with approval a statement from Corpus Juris Secundum to the
effect that "the court will not disturb the decision of the assessors unless it is clearly erroneous, or, unless, as required by statute, the assessment is manifestly excessive, fraudulent, or oppressive.""', The limited
scope of review announced in St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. is
consistent with the legislative character of the power exercised by an
assessing body and supports the conclusion that courts cannot constitutionally be empowered to substitute their judgment for that of assessing
bodies.
The taxpayer who wishes to challenge a tax imposed at the state
rather than the local level must also initially litigate the matter before
an administrative hearing officer. Under the Arkansas Tax Procedure
Act he must first apply to the Commissioner of Revenues for relief
from a proposed assessment.117 The Commissioner is required to appoint a hearing officer to conduct a hearing on the proposed assessment. 1 8 The decision of the hearing officer, following review and revision by the Commissioner, can be contested in the Pulaski County
Chancery Court or the chancery court of the county where the taxpayer resides, but the taxpayer must either pay the tax found due or
post a bond for double the tax due before seeking judicial review.1 69
When reviewing a tax case, the chancery court tries the matter de
70

novo. 1

The Tax Procedure Act raises several questions under the separation of powers article. One is whether a hearing officer or other admin165. 227 Ark. at 1069, 304 S.W.2d at 299. See also Cook v. Surplus Trading Co., 182 Ark.
420, 31 S.W.2d 521 (1930).
166. 227 Ark. at 1069, 304 S.W.2d at 299.
167. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-4719 (1980). The Arkansas Tax Procedure Act, ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 84-4701 to 84-4744 (1980), does not apply to certain types of taxes imposed at the state
level. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-4702 (1980).
168. ARK. STAT. ANN. 9 84-4720 (1980).
169. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-4721 (Supp. 1983).
170. Id.
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istrative tribunal can be vested with the power to make factual determinations affecting the tax liability of an individual taxpayer. Although
this appears to be a judicial function under the Ozarks test, the question is academic so long as the taxpayer can secure de novo review of
the determination in chancery court.1 71 By requiring the taxpayer to
pursue his administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of an
assessment, the Act ensures that the Commissioner has an opportunity
to correct erroneous assessments and thereby avoid needless litigation.
A second separation of powers issue raised by the Arkansas Tax
Procedure Act concerns the availability of de novo chancery court review of decisions by the hearing officer. Although the cases discussed
above suggest that de novo judicial review of value determinations by
1 72
assessing bodies at the local level would violate separation of powers,
review of assessments at the state level is a different proposition. When
a board of equalization determines the value at which property is to be
assessed for purposes of the ad valorem property tax, or when the
board of commissioners of an improvement district determine assessments for a special improvement, it acts in a legislative capacity. The
hearing officer appointed by the Commissioner of Revenues applies existing laws to a particular set of facts. He performs functions that could
have been vested originally in the courts. If the power to make such
determinations could have been vested originally in the courts, separation of powers does not preclude a de novo trial in the courts upon
appeal from an administrative determination. 7 '
A third, and more interesting, separation of powers issue is
whether the Tax Procedure Act would be constitutional if it did not
provide for de novo judicial review of factual determinations at the administrative level. Because de novo review has generally been the prescribed standard, there is little direct authority on the question. In
Morley v. Fifty Cases of Whiskey174 the court considered a procedure
pursuant to which the Commissioner of Revenues could seize liquor on
which the Arkansas excise tax had not been paid. Anyone claiming an
interest in the liquor could demand a hearing before the Commissioner
to determine his rights to the liquor. Following the hearing the Commissioner made written findings of fact and entered an order that could
be appealed to circuit court. The procedure was challenged on the
171. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
172. See St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 227 Ark. 1066,
304 S.W.2d 297 (1957) and text accompanying note 164.
173. See Matlock 11, 206 Ark. 1145, 178 S.W.2d 662 (1944).
174. 216 Ark. 528, 226 S.W.2d 344 (1950).
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grounds that it attempted to make the Commissioner a "court" and
vest him with judicial powers. The supreme court responded by treating
the Commissioner's determination as a preliminary step in the process
of adjudicating a forfeiture of the liquor; the proceeding in circuit court
was deemed an original proceeding which reached the court by "removal" rather than by "appeal." In support of the constitutionality of
the procedure, the court cited Matlock II, which used similar reasoning
to justify de novo review of civil service commission decisions. The
opinion is vague about the weight to be given the Commissioner's determination in the court proceeding. According to the court, there is a
right to a "fair and legal trial" on the issue of forfeiture but not a right
to a jury trial. 7" The court's statement about a "fair and legal trial"
plus its citation of Matlock H implies that the circuit court was to try
the forfeiture issue de novo. The court might adopt a similar approach
with respect to the Tax Procedure Act: the administrative hearing prescribed by the Act is but a preliminary step in the assessment process,
and the taxpayer is entitled to de novo judicial review at some state in
the tax proceeding.
If the court in Morley was referring to a statutory and not a constitutional right to a "fair and legal trial," then perhaps de novo review
of administrative determinations affecting tax liabilities is not
mandatory. The supreme court has held that an action by the state to
collect taxes is not a common law action in which the taxpayer is entitled to a jury trial and has likened the action to one for an "intricate
accounting" in which a chancery court has jurisdiction. 176 When a
party seeks an accounting, chancery courts frequently rely on special
masters to make factual determinations that are binding on the court
unless "clearly erroneous. '"177 And as discussed above, the United
States Supreme Court has cited the use of special masters to support
its conclusion that separation of powers does not require all factual determinations in the court to be made by the judge. 7 8 Arguably, the
175. Id. at 533, 226 S.W.2d at 346.
176. Hardin v. Norsworthy, 204 Ark. 943, 946, 165 S.W.2d 609, 611 (1942).
177. ARK. R. Civ. P. 53.
178. See supra note 118 and accompanying text and infra note 231 and accompanying text.
Congress has established the Tax Court, which is an article I "legislative court," to hear petitions
from taxpayers who wish to contest a federal tax liability without first paying the tax assessed. 26
U.S.C. § 7441 (1982). Decisions by the Tax Court are appealable to the circuit court of appeals
where they are reviewed "in the same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district
courts in civil actions tried without a jury." 28 U.S.C. § 7482 (1982). Thus, factual determinations
by the Tax Court must be upheld on appeal unless "clearly erroneous." Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960).
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Arkansas General Assembly can establish an administrative tribunal to
adjudicate tax controversies, and it is not obliged to provide for de novo
judicial review of factual determinations by the tribunal.'7 9
Cases falling into the second category further demonstrate that the
power to make factual determinations affecting the rights of a particular person is not necessarily judicial in character. An agency may exercise legislative power when it makes certain types of factual determinations incidental to the taking of specific private property, imposing
restrictions on the use of specific private property, or fixing assessments
on specific private property.
The cases discussed in the first category (those in which a particular person seeks something from the government) and the cases discussed in the second category (those in which the government seeks
something from a particular person) share a common feature. Although
the rights of a particular person are at stake, the public also has an
interest in the outcome of the controversy. The United States Supreme
Court has long recognized that Congress may use either a judicial or a
nonjudicial forum to adjudicate matters involving "public rights."' 80
According to the Court, the "public rights" doctrine extends only to
matters arising "between the Government and persons subject to its
authority in connection with the performance of the constitutional
179. There is one other tax related situation in which separation of powers issues have been
raised. An administrative agency is sometimes empowered to issue a certificate of indebtedness
that has the force and effect of a judgment against the taxpayer when filed with the circuit clerk
of the county where the taxpayer resides. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-4723 (1980). This procedure
has sometimes been attacked on the grounds that it vests an administrative agency with judicial
powers. New St. Mary's Gin, Inc. v. Moore, 232 Ark. 24, 334 S.W.2d 683 (1960); Jones v.
Crouch, 231 Ark. 720, 332 S.W.2d 238 (1960); Clay County v. Brown Lumber Co., 90 Ark. 413,
119 S.W. 251 (1909). The primary constraint on the use of summary collection of taxes by an
administrative agency is ARK. CONsT. art. XVI, § 13, which gives any citizen the right to seek the
protection of the courts from "the enforcement of any illegal exactions whatever." On several
occasions taxpayers have responded to the filing or threatened filing of a certificate of indebtedness
by seeking an injunction in chancery court under art. XVI, § 13. The availability of injunctive
relief depends on the character of the taxpayer's challenge. If the challenge is on the grounds that
there is no tax due because the tax is unconstitutional, or that the transaction or property is not
subject to taxation under the applicable statute, or that the person assessed is not the party
charged with payment of the tax under the applicable statute, then the chancery court may issue
an injunction under art. XVI, § 23 to prevent an illegal exaction. Hardin v. Norsworthy, 204 Ark.
943, 946, 165 S.W.2d 609, 611 (1942). But if the challenge relates only to the amount of a valid
tax owed by the taxpayer, injunctive relief is not available. Hardin v. Gautney, 204 Ark. 943, 946,
164 S.W.2d 609, 611 (1942). The taxpayer's only alternative in such a case is to pay the contested
tax due and then proceed in the Pulaski County Circuit Court to recover the overcharge. Scurlock
v. Yarbrough, 224 Ark. 113, 271 S.W.2d 916 (1954); Cook v. Hickenbottom, 212 Ark. 768, 207
S.W.2d 721 (1948).
180. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855).
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functions of the executive or legislative departments. 18 1
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court has never expressly recognized the "public rights" doctrine, the doctrine seems to explain the
cases discussed thus far in which nonjudicial bodies were permitted to
make determinations affecting the rights and liabilities of particular
persons. In virtually all these cases, the nonjudicial body was acting on
matters affecting "public rights" pursuant to an express constitutional
grant of power to the General Assembly. The cases discussed thus far
suggest that in exercising its constitutional powers, the General Assembly has several options. It can clearly define the interest of the public
by creating a fixed right in particular persons subject to its authority. If
it creates a fixed statutory right, the General Assembly can use either a
court or an administrative agency to determine whether a particular
person possesses that right. On the other hand, rather than clearly define the public interest, the General Assembly may grant the decisionmaker the discretion to define the public interest on a case by case
basis. In such a case, the General Assembly must use an administrative
agency. It cannot, consistent with separation of powers, authorize the
courts to make such determinations, either originally or when reviewing
agency determinations.
Denying the courts the power to determine or redetermine questions involving executive or legislative discretion serves an important
function underlying separation of powers. It insulates the courts from
the types of influence that may be brought to bear on highly political
decisions. When a decision involves determining what is in the best interest of the public, the public expects to have some input into that
decision. But the judicial process, with its focus on adjudicating the
rights of the parties before the court, is not amenable to input from the
general public, and it is doubtful that the process should be altered to
allow public input. Although it was addressing the dangers of empowering the courts to make appointments to political office, the observations of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Oates v. Rogers'82 are equally
applicable to determinations involving the exercise of executive or legislative discretion:
Common knowledge teaches, and experience informs us, that most
people who apply for public office have the backing of influential
friends, and are themselves prominently connected. Unfortunately we
have not reached that ideal state where friend interested in friend will
181.
182.

Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932).
201 Ark. 335, 144 S.W.2d 457 (1940).
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circumscribe his or her activity merely because the appointive power
is judicial.
Judges should not be subjected to these experiences.
The same can be said of a decision granting a liquor license, rezoning or refusing to rezone a lot, equalizing property assessments, or
fixing special improvement assessments. By limiting judicial review of
such decisions, the separation of powers doctrine reduces the potential
for judicial involvement in highly political decisions about questions of
public policy.
V.

ELECTION CONTESTS

A couple of principles emerge from the cases discussed thus far.
First, the use of nonjudicial agencies to make determinations affecting
the rights and liabilities of private parties is usually upheld when public
rights are also involved. Second, courts should not become too closely
involved in deciding essentially political questions. Although election
contests normally involve disputes between private persons, the public
has a direct interest in the outcome of the dispute. Election contests are
also likely to raise political questions. In deciding the appropriate forum in which to contest an election, the supreme court has had the
advantage of fairly explicit constitutional language and has not been
forced to rely on cases in other areas distinguishing judicial and legislative power.
Article VI, section 5 of the Arkansas Constitution provides for
contested elections for Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer of
State, Auditor, and Attorney General to be decided by the members of
both houses of the General Assembly in joint session. In construing a
similar provision of the Constitution of 1868, the supreme court held
that the power to determine which of two candidates had been duly
elected to the office of governor was vested exclusively in the General
Assembly and that no court had jurisdiction to determine such a question or review the determination made by the General Assembly. 1
The same result would undoubtedly be reached under the present
constitution.
Article V, section 11 of the constitution makes each house of the
183. Id. at 346, 144 S.W.2d at 462. It has been suggested that one consideration in determining the character of a power is whether it would "involve the judiciary in situations that might
reflect on the judges' reputations for independence and freedom from politics." F. COOPER, STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 27 (1965).
184. Baxter v. Brooks, 29 Ark. 173 (1874); State ex rel. Baxter, 28 Ark. 129 (1873).
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General Assembly the sole judge of the qualifications, returns, and
elections of its own members. Based on this provision the supreme court

has held that the judicial branch is without jurisdiction to decide an
election contest involving a seat in the General Assembly.18 5 Since the
respective houses of the General Assembly have the exclusive power to
determine the qualification of members, they can also determine the
eligibility of a person for a seat in the House or Senate, even in the
absence of an election contest. Consequently, the court has refused to
review a decision by the Senate to seat a convicted criminal in spite of
article V, section 9 of the constitution which provides that no person
convicted of an "infamous crime" shall be eligible to hold a seat in the
General Assembly.'
The power to resolve election contests at the local level is also addressed by the constitution. Article VII, section 52 grants a right to
appeal to the circuit court, where the matter is tried de novo, a decision
of an inferior board, council or tribunal in an election contest involving

a county, township, or municipal office. This provision necessarily implies that the General Assembly can delegate to a nonjudicial body the
power to decide an election contest involving a county, township, or
municipal office, but the decision of the body is subject to de novo judicial review. 8 7 The circuit courts are not constitutionally limited to appellate review of election contests, however, and nothing prevents the

General Assembly from vesting the circuit courts with original jurisdiction to decide an election contest involving a county, township, or mu185. Pendergrass v. Shied, 241 Ark. 908, 411 S.W.2d 5 (1967); Parrish v. Nelson, 186 Ark.
786, 55 S.W.2d 922 (1933); Young v. Boles, 92 Ark. 242, 122 S.W. 496 (1909).
186. State ex rel. Evans v. Wheatley, 197 Ark. 997, 125 S.W.2d 101 (1939). See also Irby v.
Barrett, 204 Ark. 682, 163 S.W.2d 512 (1942). The courts may enjoin a member of the General
Assembly from holding dual offices contrary to art. V, § 10 of the constitution. Starnes v. Sadler,
237 Ark. 325, 372 S.W.2d 585 (1963). In Reaves v. Jones, 257 Ark. 210, 515 S.W.2d 201 (1974),
the court held that it did have jurisdiction to consider whether the General Assembly was in
session at the time the Senate voted to exclude a member.
There may be federal constitutional limits on the power of the respective houses of the General
Assembly to judge the qualifications of members. In Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), the
United States Supreme Court held that the refusal of the Georgia legislature to seat a member
because he would not take the oath of allegiance to the state violated the member's first amendment right of free speech. See also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), in which the
Court held that in judging the qualifications of one of its members, Congress was limited to considering those qualifications for office prescribed by the Constitution.
187. "There is nothing in the Constitution, that we can see, which requires that the contest
should be made before the county court or that restrains the Legislature from erecting some other
tribunal or board for its determination; on the contrary, the power of the Legislature to establish
such, if not distinctly express, is implied in section 52 of article VII." Govan v. Jackson, 32 Ark.
553, 557 (1877).
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nicipal office. 188 In fact, if the General Assembly fails to provide for a
specific method of contesting an election to such an office, the circuit
court has residuary jurisdiction to decide the election by way of a quo
warranto proceeding. 189
Article XIX, section 24 of the constitution states that the General
Assembly shall provide the mode of contesting elections in cases not
specifically provided for in the constitution. This section gives the legislature much broader discretion to select the forum for an election contest involving a local office other than a county, township, or municipal
office; involving a state office other than the executive offices specifically mentioned in article VI, section 4; or involving an issue rather
than candidates. It can vest jurisdiction to hear such contests in either
the circuit court or in a nonjudicial body. The history of contests involving school board elections illustrates the legislature's options under
article XIX, section 24. Currently, exclusive jurisdiction to hear school
election contests lies in the circuit court.1 90 But in the past, the court
has upheld statutes vesting exclusive original jurisdiction to hear such
contests in the county board of education191 and in the county court. 19
If in a situation covered by article XIX, section 24, the General
Assembly does decide to use a nonjudicial body to try an election contest, it also has considerable flexibility on the matter of judicial review
of factual determinations by the body. Since it could have vested the
courts with original jurisdiction to hear the contest, it can provide for
de novo review on appeal. Alternatively, it may provide for a more limited standard of review, or perhaps even preclude judicial review. In
Shibley v. Fort Smith & Van Buren District 11,198 which involved the
contest of an election on the formation of an improvement district, the
court stated that: "Where the legislature has created a tribunal for the
purpose of ascertaining and declaring the result of an election, its decision is conclusive, and cannot be reviewed by the courts. 1 94 Three
years later, the court decided that this language might be somewhat
188. Sumpter v. Duffle, 80 Ark. 369, 97 S.W. 435 (1906).
189. Purdy v. Glover, 199 Ark. 63, 132 S.W.2d 821 (1939).
190. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-321 (1980); Adams v. Dixie School Dist. No. 7, 264 Ark. 178,
570 S.W.2d 603 (1978).
191. Attwood v. Rodgers, 206 Ark. 834, 177 S.W.2d 723 (1944).
192. Jackson v. Collins, 193 Ark. 737, 102 S.W.2d 548 (1937). In Stafford v. Cook, 159 Ark.
438, 252 S.W. 597 (1923), the office of school director was held to be a "county office," which
would mean that art. VII, § 52, rather than art. XIX, § 24 was the source of legislative power to
designate the forum for contesting election to the office.
193. 96 Ark. 411, 132 S.W. 444 (1910).
194. Id. at 424, 132 S.W. at 450.
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broad. It qualified the Shibley statement by holding that a chancery
court did have jurisdiction to correct a finding by a nonjudicial body
regarding an improvement district election when it was alleged that the
finding was "fraudulent."' 5 Nevertheless, Shibley suggests that in an
election contest covered by article XIX, section 24, the General Assembly could limit judicial review of factual determinations by a nonjudicial body.
VI.

CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES

When a controversy involves "public rights," the General Assembly can designate either a court or a nonjudicial body to make factual
determinations affecting the rights and liabilities of a particular person.
When the determination involves the exercise of executive or legislative
discretion, use of a nonjudicial body becomes mandatory. But when
there is no direct public interest in the outcome of a controversy, the
ability of the General Assembly to use nonjudicial bodies is much more
limited. The power to hear a controversy between two private persons
and determine the rights of the parties is the quintessential judicial
power. The fact that Ozarks involved such a controversy between two
private parties undoubtedly explains in part the broad language used
by the court. But even when "private rights" are involved, the General
Assembly may still have some flexibility to use a nonjudicial body to
make factual determinations affecting the rights of the parties.
A.

Property and Personal Injury Claims

The General Assembly has occasionally attempted to vest a nonjudicial body with the power to determine the amount of damages recoverable for an injury to property or person. St. Louis, L M. & S. Railway Co. v. Williams'9 6 involved the constitutionality of an act designed
to speed the settlement of claims for livestock killed or injured by railroads. Either the owner of the livestock or the railroad could submit the
question of damages to a board of appraisers by serving notice on the
other party. Although the award by the board could be appealed to
circuit court, which tried the matter de novo, the party taking the appeal was liable for the attorney fees of the other party if the award by
195. 106 Ark. 151, 153 S.W. 259 (1913). About the same time the court was taking the
position that courts could not review the legislative determination that private property was being
taken for a public use, but that equity could intervene to prevent a "fraudulent" attempt to condemn private property for a private use. See Sloan v. Lawrence County, 134 Ark. 121, 203 S.W.
260 (1918).
196. 49 Ark. 492, 5 S.W. 883 (1887).
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the court was no more favorable to the appealing party than the award
of the board of appraisers. The supreme court held that article II, section 13 of the Arkansas Constitution entitles one "to have his rights
enforced, his wrongs redressed, and his liabilities determined in the
courts."1"" It therefore invalidated the statute on the grounds that the
provision for payment of attorney fees penalized a party who chose to
assert his constitutional right to a jury trial and his right to a remedy
in the courts.
St. Louis, I. M. & S. Railway Co. v. Williams was cited with
approval in Grimmett v. Digby, 98 in which a state trooper who had
been sued by a motorist for injuries suffered in a collision with the
trooper's state owned vehicle argued that the State Claims Commission
possessed exclusive jurisdiction to hear personal injury claims against
state employees related to their official duties. In rejecting this contention, the supreme court stated that any attempt to vest a commission or
administrative agency with the power to adjudicate personal injury
claims would violate the rights of the injured to a trial by jury, as guaranteed by article II, section 7 of the Arkansas Constitution, and to a
certain remedy in the law, as guaranteed by article II, section 13 of the
Arkansas Constitution.
B.

Employment Related Injuries

The Worker's Compensation Commission is the premier example
of an administrative agency vested with the power to make factual determinations affecting the rights of private parties. Amendment 26 to
the constitution authorizes the General Assembly to provide the
"means, methods, and forum" for adjudicating the amount of compensation to be paid by employers for injuries or death of employees. This
comprehensive grant of power to the General Assembly is the most obvious way to reconcile the functions of the Commission with separation
of powers as well as the other constitutional limits on the power of the
General Assembly to vest fact-finding functions affecting private rights
in a nonjudicial body. In fact, in Grimmett v. Digby, the court stated in
197. Id. at 498, 5 S.W. at 885. Art. II, § 13 provides that:
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs he
may receive in his person, property or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and
without purchase, completely, and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.
The opinion quotes art. 11, § 13, in its entirety. It also states that appellant had a right to have
damages assessed by a jury, but it does not refer specifically to art. II, § 7, which guarantees a
right to trial by jury.
198. 267 Ark. 192, 589 S.W.2d 579 (1979).
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dictum that the right to a jury trial guaranteed by article II, section 7
and the right to a legal remedy guaranteed by article II, section 13
made it necessary to adopt amendment 26 before a valid workmen's
compensation law could be enacted.19 9
This dictum is contradicted by the court's opinion construing the
workmen's compensation statute passed after the adoption of amendment 26. In J. L. Williams & Sons, Inc. v. Smith2 0 0 the Commission
awarded damages to an injured employee based on conflicting medical
testimony as to the extent of the employee's work related injuries. The
award was appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the finding of
the Commission based solely on the court's evaluation of the evidence
before the Commission. The supreme court reversed citing the statutory provision which made the findings of fact by the Commission conclusive and binding on the courts. Although the compensation act was
passed pursuant to amendment 26 to the constitution, the court went
out of its way to observe that the amendment was not essential to the
constitutionality of the act:
The nature of the claimant's cause of action is such that he has no
right to insist upon any judicial review except that which the legislature saw fit to provide. The cause of action of one claiming under the
workmen's compensation act is purely statutory. The legislature could,
even in the absence of the constitutional authority to provide the forum for adjudicating such claims, have attached to the creation of
the claim the condition that such a claim could be enforced only
before a commission whose decision on question of fact should be
final.201
In support of this statement, the court cited cases involving the
state's wrongful death act.2 02 While the cases cited do stand for the
proposition that the legislature can establish conditions to the enforcement of rights that it creates, the conditions imposed by the wrongful
death act do not include a requirement that the right be determined in
a forum other than a court. The opinion also glosses over the fact that
the legislatively created right to compensation for work related injuries
was not an entirely new cause of action, without a common law counterpart. Instead, the workmen's compensation act abolished the common law right of an employee to recover from his employer for negli199. Id. at 194, 589 S.W.2d at 581.
200. 205 Ark. 604, 170 S.W.2d 82 (1943).
201. Id. at 608, 170 S.W.2d at 84 (emphasis added).
202. Anthony v. St. Louis 1. M. & S. Ry. Co., 108 Ark. 219, 157 S.W. 394 (1913); Earnest
v. St. Louis M. & S. E. Ry. Co., 87 Ark. 65, 112 S.W. 141 (1908).
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gence. Nevertheless, J. L. Williams & Sons, Inc. suggests that in 1943
the Arkansas Supreme Court would have approved the use of administrative agencies as fact-finding adjuncts of the courts, even when the
rights of private parties were involved, so long as the rights were created by the General Assembly.
In the J. L. Williams & Sons, Inc. opinion, the court also stated:
"It can be argued that if the legislature had not provided for court
review, then the courts could not have considered such cases at all, except for questions of due process under the federal constitution."2 0 a Although subsequent opinions have questioned the validity of this statement,"0 4 the applicable statutes have always provided for judicial
review of Commission decisions, and it has never been necessary to test
the limits of the legislature's power to insulate Commission decisions
from judicial review. In one instance, when the legislature passed a
statute making Commission decisions final unless acted upon by the
circuit court within sixty days, the supreme court invalidated the statute as an encroachment on judicial power.20 5 Consequently, the power
of the General Assembly to limit judicial review of Commission decisions may not be as unrestricted as J. L. Williams & Son, Inc.
indicates.
The scope of judicial review of Commission decisions is somewhat
unique. The applicable statute provides that findings of fact by the
Commission are "conclusive and binding" on the courts.2 06 This language seems to place purely factual determinations by the Commission
beyond the scrutiny of a reviewing court. The courts have not adopted
this construction, but they do give greater deference to factual determinations by the Commission as compared with factual determinations of
other administrative agencies. Whether the Commission's action is supported by substantial evidence is a question of law that can be consid203. 205 Ark. at 607, 170 S.W.2d at 83.
204. Ward School Bus Mfg., Inc. v. Fowler, 261 Ark. 100, 547 S.W.2d 394 (1977).
205. Sands v. Albert Pike Motor Hotel, 245 Ark. 755, 434 S.W.2d 288 (1968).
206. Commission decisions are now appealed directly to the Court of Appeals. ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 81-1325 (Supp. 1983). The statute provides as follows with respect to standard of review:
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals no additional evidence shall be heard and,.in the
absence of fraud, the findings of fact made by the Commission, within its power, shall
be conclusive and binding upon said Court . . . .The Court shall review only questions
of law and may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the order or award,
upon any of the following grounds, and no other:
(1) That the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers.
(2) That the order or award was procured by fraud.
(3) That the facts found by the Commission do not support the order or award.
(4) That the order or award was not supported by substantial evidence of record.
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ered by the courts, 0 7 but Commission findings on issues of fact are
given the same weight as a jury finding on a controverted issue of
fact.20 8 Decisions will not be reversed unless the proof is so nearly undisputed that fair-minded men could not reach the conclusion arrived
at by the Commission.
The possibility that certain factual determinations by the Commission may have constitutional implications has never been considered by
the court. Amendment 26 authorizes the General Assembly to enact
compensation laws "prescribing the amount of compensation to be paid
by employers for injuries or death of employees." Unless the relationship of employer and employee exists in a particular case, the Commission lacks jurisdiction to consider a claim for compensation. If the findings of the Commission on the issue of the employment relationship are
conclusive and binding on the courts, then the Commission is in a position to define the constitutional limits on its own jurisdiction. For this
reason, it can be argued that whether the employment relationship exists in a particular case is a "jurisdictional fact" that must be determined de novo by the courts. 10
C.

Contract Rights

The use of nonjudicial officers to adjudicate private contract rights
was considered by the supreme court in Thornbrough v. Williams.)
At issue was an act of the General Assembly which authorized the
Commissioner of Labor to resolve wage disputes between an employer
and an employee. The wage resolution procedure could be initiated by
either the employer or the employee and provided for a hearing before
the Commissioner followed by written findings of fact and an award.
Instead of providing for an appeal of the Commissioner's determination
to a court, the Act stated that: "If either employer or employee shall
fail to refuse to accept the findings of the commissioner, then either
shall have the right to proceed at law as now or hereinafter provided. ' 21 2 An employer whose employees had filed wage claims with
the Commissioner pursuant to the Act obtained an injunction against
207. Cummings v. United Motor Exch., 236 Ark. 735, 368 S.W.2d 82 (1963).
208. Clark v. Peabody Testing Serv., 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979).
209. Id.
210. See supra note 111 for discussion of Crowell v. Benson and "jurisdictional facts." Covington, supra note 16, at 141-44, criticizes the holding of Crowell v. Benson and argues that
judicial review of Commission findings of fact should be limited, even if the facts are "jurisdictional facts."
211. 225 Ark. 709, 284 S.W.2d 641 (1955).

212.

ARK. STAT. ANN.

§ 81-312 (1976).
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the Commissioner on grounds that included the assertion that the statute was an unconstitutional attempt to delegate judicial power to a
nonjudicial officer. The supreme court disagreed, citing two saving features of the Act. First, the procedure before the Commissioner was not
compulsory since one of the parties had to first request that the Commissioner settle the dispute. Second, once the Commissioner made a
finding, either party could refuse to accept the finding and institute an
original action in a court.
The effect to be given the Commissioner's finding in the legal action was unclear. The statute stated that his findings were presumed to
be the amount due the employee. The employer challenged the constitutionality of the procedural burden imposed by this provision and
thereby presented the court with the opportunity to determine whether
the employer's right to a jury trial and/or a remedy in the courts precluded the use of the Commissioner of Labor as a fact-finding adjunct
to the court. The court found it unnecessary to rule on the employer's
contention until the issue had been presented to the court below.
These cases, while few in number, demonstrate that the General
Assembly does have some flexibility to use an administrative agency
rather than the courts to resolve disputes between private parties. The
constraints within which the General Assembly may exercise this discretion are article II, section 7 (right to trial by jury), article II, section
13 (right to a legal remedy), and article II (separation of powers).
Clearly, article II, section 7 limits the power of the General Assembly to vest fact-finding functions affecting private rights in an administrative agency. When the right to trial by jury applies, the legislature cannot use an administrative agency either as a forum or as a factfinding adjunct of a court. But the right to a jury trial applies only in
those instances in which the right existed at the time the constitution
was adopted. 13 Consequently, when the General Assembly creates a
new right or new cause of action, it is not required to provide for a jury
trial with respect to the right or cause of action.
If St. Louis, I. M. & S. Railway Co. v. Williams2 1 ' and Grimmett
v. Digby21 5 are correct in concluding that article II, section 13 guarantees every person "his day in court," then that constitutional provision
also limits the power of the General Assembly to use administrative
agencies to adjudicate private rights. The section entitles every person
"to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs he may re213.
214.
215.

See Jones v. Reed, 267 Ark. 237, 590 S.W.2d 6 (1979) and cases cited therein.
49 Ark. 492, 5 S.W. 883 (1887).
267 Ark. 192, 589 S.W.2d 579 (1979).
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ceive in his person, property or character." Williams and Grimmett
equate "a remedy in the laws" with "a remedy in the courts." They
never explain why a remedy before an administrative agency fails to
satisfy the constitution." 6 Even if article II, section 13 does entitle a
person to a remedy in the courts "for all injuries and wrongs," the
right, like the right to a jury trial, probably applies only in those circumstances in which the right to a remedy in the courts existed at the
time the constitution was adopted. Statutes abolishing or limiting common law causes of action have often been attacked as violative of the
provision. The court has ruled that article II, section 13 protects only
those rights of action that were well established when the constitution
was adopted, and that it does not limit the power of the General Assembly to enact remedial legislation." When the General Assembly
passes a statute recognizing a new type of "injury" or "wrong" (i.e., it
creates a new right or remedy), it can constitutionally provide for the
right or remedy to be enforced in a forum other than a court2 1 8
A final constitutional obstacle to using an administrative agency to
adjudicate disputes between two private parties is the separation of
powers article. Thornbrough v. Williams is the only case discussed
above in which the issue was specifically raised, and it is difficult to
draw conclusions about the status of Arkansas law from that one opinion. The question was considered recently by the United State Supreme
Court in Northen Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line. 1
At issue was the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Reform Act,
which extended the jurisdiction of bankruptcy judges to "all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 (the Bankruptcy Code) or rising in or
related to cases under Title 11." Article III of the United States Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States in the Supreme
Court and such inferior courts as Congress shall establish. Because
bankruptcy judges did not enjoy the life tenure or protection from salary diminution provided by Article III of the Constitution, they were
216. Cf. Alcorn v. Bliss-Cook Oak Co., 133 Ark. 118, 201 S.W. 797 (1918) (statute authorizing levee inspectors to levy assessments which became a lien on property did not deny landowner
its "day in court" since owner had opportunity to appear before inspectors and contest assessment
levied against its property); State Medical Bd. of Ark. Medical Society v. McCrary, 95 Ark. 511,
130 S.W. 544 (1910) (due process or "law of the land" was not synonymous with a judicial
proceeding).
217. See Hardin v. City of Devalls Bluff, 256 Ark. 480, 508 S.W.2d 559 (1974) and cases
cited therein.
218. Compare the quotation from J. L. Williams & Sons, Inc. v. Smith, 205 Ark. 604, 608,
170 S.W.2d 82, 84 (1943). See supra note 201 and accompanying text for the quotation.
219. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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not Article III judges. Hence, the question before the Court was
whether judicial power could be exercised by judges who did not enjoy
the protection of Article III. According to the Court, two principles
determine the extent to which Congress can vest nonjudicial tribunals
220
with the power to adjudicate "private rights:1
(1) When Congress creates a substantive federal right, it has substantial discretion to determine the manner in which the right is to be
adjudicated and can constitutionally assign some fact-finding functions
related to such adjudication to non-Article III tribunals.
(2) The fact-finding functions assigned to non-Article III tribunals
must be limited in such a way as to ensure that the "essential attributes" of judicial power are retained in an Article III court.
The bankruptcy court system failed both tests. The rights subject
to adjudication were not created by Congress, and all "essential attributes" of judicial power were vested in the bankruptcy court. A majority
of the Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. did not view the
assignment of fact-finding functions to non-Article III tribunals as an
exception to the separation of powers doctrine. Instead, the use of nonjudicial tribunals as fact-finding "adjuncts" to Article III courts was
entirely consistent with the constitutional vesting of judicial power in
Article III courts so long as the "essential attributes" of judicial power
were retained in Article III courts. 2 1
There is precedent in the opinions of the Arkansas Supreme Court
that would permit using administrative agencies to adjudicate private
rights when the two principles discussed in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. are satisfied. The dictum from J. L. Williams & Sons,
Inc. supports the first of the two principles: when the General Assembly
creates a remedy, it can attach to the remedy the condition that it be
22 2 In Oates v. Rogers,223
enforced before an administrative agency.
which involved a statute that vested judges with appointment powers
reserved to the executive branch, the Arkansas Supreme Court endorsed a separation of powers rule similar to the second principle. The
court adopted as the "true construction" of the separation of powers
article the rule that: "A statute is not invalid as improperly conferring
executive powers where the actual power of the executive department is
not really diminished."22 4 Likewise, a statute is not invalid as improp220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 80-81.
Id. at 77 n.29.
205 Ark. 604, 170 S.W.2d 82 (1943).
201 Ark. 335, 144 S.W.2d 457 (1940).
Id. at 339, 144 S.W.2d at 459.
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erly conferring judicial powers where the actual power of the judicial
department is not really diminished. And the actual power of the judicial department is not diminished when an administrative agency adjudicates private rights so long as the essential attributes of judicial
power are retained by the courts.
If the courts are to retain the essential attributes of judicial power
in a system where administrative agencies make determinations affecting private rights, then the decisions of those agencies must be subject
to judicial review. Thus, we can reject at the outset the suggestion in J.
L. Williams & Sons, Inc. that the General Assembly could insulate
from judicial review administrative decisions affecting legislatively created private rights. 25 If judicial review is available, then the courts will
have the final say on questions of constitutional and statutory construction as well as other questions of law. Such questions must be decided
independently by the courts, and there is no reason to give the conclusions of an administrative agency on issues of law any particular
weight.2 26
A more difficult problem is the effect to be given factual determinations by an administrative agency that affect private rights. If such
factual determinations are subject to de novo review by a court, then
clearly the essential attributes of judicial power are retained by the
judicial branch. The availability of de novo review was primarily responsible for the supreme court's willingness in Thornbrough v. Williams to sanction the use of a nonjudicial officer to decide rights under
a private employment contract.227 Similarly, in Morley v. Fifty Cases
of Whiskey,2 which involved factual determinations affecting public
rights, the availability of de novo judicial review mooted any separation
of powers problems. What is not clear from the Arkansas decisions is
whether the power of the judiciary is "really diminished" when the applicable statute provides for anything less than de novo review of fac225. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. The supreme court later indicated that the
statement in J. L. Williams & Son, Inc. regarding judicial review was probably untenable. Ward
School Bus Mfg., Inc. v. Fowler, 261 Ark. 100, 547 S.W.2d 394 (1977).
226. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 267 Ark. 550, 593
S.W.2d 434 (1980):
It is not for the courts to advise the commission how to discharge its functions in arriving at findings of fact or in exercising its discretion. . . . On the other hand, it is
clearly for the courts to decide the questions of law involved and to direct the commission where it has not 'pursued' its authority in compliance with the statutes governing it
or with the state or federal constitutions.
Id. at 557, 593 S.W.2d at 439.
227. 225 Ark. 709, 284 S.W.2d 641 (1955).
228. 216 Ark. 528, 226 S.W.2d 344 (1950).
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tual determinations by a nonjudicial tribunal.
The United States Supreme Court does not require that factual
determinations by an administrative agency affecting private rights be
subject to de novo judicial review. The use of administrative agencies
as fact-finding adjuncts of Article III courts was first approved in
Crowell v. Benson,2" which involved the constitutionality of a statute
that vested the United States Employees' Compensation Commission
with the power to make factual determinations related to the compensation of employees for work-related injuries incurred upon the navigable waters of the United States. Orders of the Commission were appealable to the courts where they could be set aside if "not supported
by the evidence." The employer in Crowell v. Benson challenged an
award of the Commission on several grounds including the contention
that the statute represented an unconstitutional attempt to vest the judicial power of the United States in a non-Article III tribunal. After
discussing the "public rights" exception to the requirement that judicial power be vested in Article III courts,2"' the court turned to the
case before it:
The present case does not fall within the categories just described but
is one of private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to
another under the law as defined. But in cases of that sort, there is no
requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of the
judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall
be made by judges. On the common law side of the Federal courts,
the aid of juries is not only deemed appropriate but is required by the
Constitution itself. In cases of equity and admiralty, it is historic
practice to call to the assistance of the courts, without the consent of
the parties, masters and commissioners or assessors, to pass upon certain classes of questions, as, for example, to take and state an account
or to find the amount of damages. While the reports of masters and
commissioners in such cases are essentially of an advisory nature, it
has not been the practice to disturb their findings when they are properly based upon evidence, in the absence of errors of law, and the
parties have no right to demand that the court shall redetermine the
facts thus found." 1
229. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
230. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
231. 285 U.S. at 51-52. The United States Supreme Court has since applied the same reasoning to other situations. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Atlas Roofing Co.
v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). In Raddatz the Court upheld the use of a
magistrate to adjudicate constitutionally created rights, but the findings and recommendations of
the magistrate were subject to de novo review by the district court.
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A similar argument can be made under the Arkansas separation of
powers article. The use of nonjudicial tribunals as fact-finding adjuncts
of the courts does not really detract from the judicial power of the
courts even when the findings of fact are subject to less than de novo
review by the courts. In fact, if the analogy to masters and commissioners is accepted, the argument that de novo review is unnecessary becomes quite compelling. Arkansas courts are empowered to use masters, commissioners, or assessors to make findings of fact in cases
involving private rights to which the right to a jury trial does not apply.2"' The court must accept such findings of fact "unless clearly erroneous." 3 While a "clearly erroneous" standard might result in too
much weight being given to the factual determinations of the nonjudicial tribunal,23 ' perhaps a less deferential standard, such as whether the
determination is "supported by substantial evidence," would suffice to
prevent any real diminution in the judicial power of the court.
VII.

SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION

At this point, it should be apparent that the supreme court's opinion in Ozarks oversimplifies the actual allocation of powers between the
courts and administrative agencies. Administrative agencies can, in certain situations, be empowered to "investigate, declare, and enforce liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed
already to exist."2 3 " Separation of powers does not necessarily preclude
an administrative agency from determining "issues of fact from past
actions involving a particular individual within existing laws and deciding the liabilities involved."2 38 Agency jurisdiction is not limited to
"looking to the future and making a new rule or standard affecting the
'23 7
public or group generally.
It may be unfair, though, to treat the Ozarks opinion as a comprehensive statement of the standards to be used to allocate powers between the courts and administrative agencies. The tests that were used
232.

ARK. R. Civ. P. 53.
233. ARK. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(1).
234. In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the
application of a "clearly erroneous" rather than a "substantial evidence" standard to factual determinations of the bankruptcy court was one of the reasons the court held that the Bankruptcy
Reform Act failed to retain the "essential attributes" of judicial power in an Article III court. 458
U.S. at 85.
235. See supra note 12 and accompanying text for the complete quotation.
236. See supra note 13 and accompanying text for the complete quotation.
237. Id.
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in Ozarks have been applied most often in cases involving the Arkansas

Public Service Commission, 2 8 and the court may have been referring
solely to limits on the powers of that agency when it made or endorsed
the statements quoted above. The Commission is a part of the legisla-

tive department 2

9

and many of its functions, such as setting rates24

and allocating service territories, 241 are clearly legislativein character,
even under the restrictive definition of legislative power employed by
the court in Ozarks.2 42 But, in accordance with the cases and principles
discussed above, the Commission can also make factual determinations
affecting the rights and liabilities of a particular person.
A.

Eminent Domain Proceedings

Before undertaking certain types of new construction, public utilities are required to secure a Commission determination of the "public
necessity" or "public need" for the construction.2 4 Once a utility has
obtained a construction certificate from the Commission, it can then

proceed in circuit court to condemn private property in connection with
the construction.
The Commission's determination of the need for
new construction, as well as the site or route of the construction, obviously affects the particular property owners whose land may be taken
238. See supra note 12.
239. Although it is not always clear whether a particular administrative agency should be
assigned to the executive department or the legislative department, the Public Serv. Commission
has traditionally been treated as a part of the legislative department. See Dept. of Pub. Util. v.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W.2d 213 (1940); Dept. of Pub. Util. v. McConnell, 198 Ark. 502, 130 S.W.2d 9 (1939).
240. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-117, 73-202a, 73-218 (1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-217
(Supp. 1983).
241. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-240, 73-241 (1979).
242. See also Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Arkansas Public Serv. Comm'n, 267 Ark. 550,
593 S.W.2d 434 (1980) (ratemaking is a legislative function); Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v.
Coxsey, 257 Ark. 534, 518 S.W.2d 485 (1975) (allocation of service territories is a legislative
function).
243. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-240 (1979) provides: "No new construction or operation of any
equipment or facilities for supplying a public service, or extension thereof, shall be undertaken
without first obtaining from the Commission a certificate that public convenience and necessity
require, or will require, such construction or operation ...." The Utility Facility Environmental
and Economic Protection Act, 1973 Ark. Acts 164 codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-276 to 73276.18 (1979) requires utilities to obtain a certificate of environmental compatibility and public
need before undertaking the construction of a "major utility facility."
244. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-276.15 (1979), which applies to eminent domain proceedings
following the issuance of a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need with respect
to a major utility facility. See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 35-201 (1962) (telegraph and telephone
companies); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 35-305 (1962) (light and power utilities); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 35405 (1962) (water and electric utilities supplying municipalities); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 35-602
(1962) (oil and natural gas pipelines).
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or damaged in connection with the construction. An owner can intervene in the administrative proceeding before the Commission and appeal the Commission's determination to the courts 2 4'5 but the typical
case he is not entitled to have the courts determine (or redetermine)
the "public necessity" or "public need" for the proposed construction.
The "public necessity" or "public need" considered by the Commission
refers to the utility's need for the new facilities in order to provide adequate utility service to the public. Any right to judicial review of such a
determination is a matter of legislative grace. 46 While it is true that
the landowner has a right to an independent judicial determination that
his property is being taken for a public and not a private purpose, the
public versus private question is seldom presented when a utility applies
for a certificate to undertake new construction. 4 7 In the event a landowner did contend that a public utility was attempting to take his property for a private rather than a public purpose, he would be entitled
under article II, section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution to de novo
judicial review of the Commission's determination on the question. But
the Commission's determination that a particular facility or transmission line is needed in order to assure adequate utility service to the
public, as well as its determination of the exact site of the facility or
the route of a transmission line, involves the exercise of legislative discretion, and a court is not free to substitute its judgment for that of the
Commission.
The Commission can also be empowered, in certain cases, to decide the amount of damages to be paid in a condemnation proceeding.
As discussed above, the landowner whose property is taken by a public
utility is constitutionally entitled to have a jury determine the compen245. Any person residing in a county or municipality in which a major utility facility is to be
located may intervene in a proceeding to issue a certificate of environmental compatibility and
public need. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-276.6 (1979). There is no statutory requirement that landowners be permitted to intervene in a proceeding under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-240 to issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity for new construction, but Commission rules permit such
an intervention. See Rule 3.04, Arkansas Public Service Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure (1981).
246. See the quotation from Sloan v. Lawrence County, 134 Ark. 121, 203 S.W. 260 (1925)
in the text accompanying note 99. Any party to a proceeding before the Commission can obtain
judicial review in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County of a Commission determination of "public
necessity" or "public need." ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-229.1, 73-276.10 (1979). Review is limited to
determining "whether the Commission's findings [of fact] are . . . supported by substantial evidence, and whether the Commission has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination
of whether the order or decision under review violated any right of the petitioner under the laws of
Constitution of the United States or of the State of Arkansas." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-229.1(b)

(1979).
247.

See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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sation question, and the legislature could not delegate this function to

the Commission.14 But a public utility whose property is condemned
by a municipality is not entitled to a jury trial on the question of compensation, 49 and the General Assembly can, and has, assigned this
function to the Commission rather than the courts.150 Despite language
in Town of Hoxie v. Gibson 51 suggesting that fixing the amount of
compensation is a judicial power, allowing the Commission to exercise
this power does not violate separation of powers. The amount of compensation to be paid when a municipality condemns privately owned
utility property affects the future rates of customers thereafter served
by both the municipal utility and the privately owned utility. The public interests at stake on both sides, as well as the expertise of the Com-

mission in determining the value of utility property, justify using the
Commission rather than the courts to resolve the controversy. 25 2 The

judicial power of the courts is not really diminished by the procedure.
The Commission's determination on the compensation question is sub-

ject to judicial review, and since the determination involves "constitutional facts," the appropriate standard of review is de novo rather than
the substantial evidence standard generally applicable to Commission
decisions. 5"
B.

Election Contests

In at least one situation, it might be desirable to vest the Public
Service Commission with the power to decide election contests. Act 324
of 1935254 requires that any municipal city council decision to acquire
the property of a privately owned utility be ratified at a general or
248. ARK. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
249. See supra note 114.
250. 1935 Ark. Acts 324, § 49, codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-247 (1979).
251. 155 Ark. 338, 343, 245 S.W. 332, 333 (1922).
252. In City of Helena v. Arkansas Util. Co., 208 Ark. 442, 186 S.W.2d 873 (1945), the
court held that 1935 Ark. Acts 324, § 49 did not repeal an earlier act allowing municipalities to
condemn a privately owned waterworks system in a circuit court. In response to the utility's contention that the Utilities Commission (a forerunner of the Public Service Commission) was better
equipped than a circuit court jury to determine the value of utility property, the court said:
While, as appellee contends, the Utilities Commission might be better equipped to determine values of the component parts of such a system than would a jury of 12 men,
this is an argument that might be addressed to the Legislature with more success than
to the courts, as the Legislature may provide the procedure for the condemnation of
private property for public use within constitutional bounds.
208 Ark. at 449, 186 S.W.2d at 786.
253. See supra note 111 for discussion of constitutional facts.
254. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-245 (1979).

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:279

special election. The appropriate forum for contesting a ratification
election is probably the circuit court. 55 Since the Commission is empowered to determine the compensation paid the privately owned utility, condemnation proceedings would be expedited if the Commission
were granted general jurisdiction over the proceedings, including jurisdiction to resolve any dispute regarding the ratification election. Such a
jurisdictional grant would not violate separation of powers. As explained above, article XIX, section 24 of the Arkansas Constitution
permits the General Assembly to designate a nonjudicial tribunal, such
as the Commission, to hear election contests in cases not specifically
provided for in the constitution.
C.

TerritorialDisputes Between Utilities

The Commission is empowered to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity that allocate to utilities the exclusive right to
serve customers in particular geographical areas.2 56 When it grants or
revokes a certificate of public convenience and necessity, the Commission clearly acts in a legislative capacity.2 57 In Southwestern Electric
Power Co. v. Coxsey,2 58 the supreme court applied the same tests as in
Ozarks to distinguish judicial power from legislative power and held
that chancery court was the appropriate forum for resolving a controversy between two utilities as to which was entitled to provide service to
a particular customer under existing certificates from the Commission.
The opinion is not clear as to whether the chancery court's jurisdiction
was exclusive or only concurrent with the jurisdiction of the Commission. Under the principles developed above, there is no constitutional
obstacle to vesting the Commission with the power to resolve such disputes despite the judicial nature of the inquiry. The Commission would
be adjudicating a dispute between two private parties, but the claim or
interest under consideration was created by the Commission. Neither
party would be entitled to a jury trial under article II, section 7, nor to
a remedy in the courts under article II, section 13. Moreover, the supreme court acknowledged in its opinion in Southwestern Electric
Power Co. v. Coxsey that an adverse judicial decision interpreting
rights under the certificates already in existence "would not prohibit
any interested party from seeking legislative action by the (Public Ser255.
256.
257.
(1981).
258.

Cf. Purdy v. Glover, 199 Ark. 63, 132 S.W.2d 821 (1939).
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-240, 73-241 (1979).
Redfield Tel. Co. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 273 Ark. 498, 621 S.W.2d 470
257 Ark. 534, 518 S.W.2d 485 (1981).
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vice Commission) to reallocate the territory."

"

The courts should not

adjudicate the rights of two parties when either party is free to seek
modification of the court's decision in an administrative proceeding. If
the Commission can not only adjudicate rights under existing certificates but also prospectively modify those rights, it would be far more
efficient to require utilities to litigate such questions, at least initially,
before the Commission. °
D. Disputes Between Utilities and Customers Concerning Entitlement to Utility Service
Although as a general proposition, a utility is required to provide
service to all customers residing in the territory allocated to the utility,
the Public Service Commission has adopted rules which specify when a
utility can refuse to provide service to a potential customer2 6 1 or terminate service to an existing customer.2 " Does the Commission have jurisdiction to resolve a dispute between a utility and a potential or existing customer regarding the application of these rules? If the
definition of judicial power used in Ozarks were applied, the answer
would be in the negative because the controversy involves the application of existing rules to a particular factual situation in order to determine the rights and liabilities of two private parties. But the right to
utility service was created by the General Assembly and refined by the
Commission. Clearly, there is no right to a jury trial on any factual
issues underlying the customer's claim. According to J. L. Williams &
Son, Inc. v. Smith, when the legislature creates a right, it can attach to
that right the condition that it be enforced only before an administrative agency.26' The Commission should therefore be allowed to resolve
a dispute concerning entitlement to utility service. 64
259. Id. at 537, 518 S.W.2d at 487.
260. In order to promote uniformity of regulation, federal courts will often defer to an administrative agency pursuant to the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction." See Texas & Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907). See also Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction The
Rule and Its Rationalizations,65 YALE L. J. 315 (1956); Jaffe, PrimaryJurisdiction,77 HARV.
L. REV. 1037 (1964).

261. Rule 7, APSC Rules.
262. Rule 8, APSC Rules.
263. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
264. ARK. STAT. ANN. §73-1816 (1979) requires every telephone company doing business in
the state to provide service to all applicants within its territory within ten days of a written demand for service. Although the right created by the statute was enforceable at one time by civil
action in circuit court, the statute was amended in 1955 to transfer jurisdiction to the Public
Service Commission. 1955 Ark. Acts. 120. For the reasons stated in the text, this is not unconstitutional delegation of judicial power to the Commission.
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Entitlement to utility service can also be analogized to entitlement
to public benefits. When the legislature decides to confer benefits such
as welfare assistance or unemployment compensation, separation of
powers does not preclude the use of an administrative agency to determine whether a particular person qualifies for the benefits. Likewise,
the General Assembly can delegate to the Public Service Commission
rather than the courts the power to determine whether, under existing
laws and rules, a particular person should receive utility service. 2 6
It can even be argued that determining whether a utility should be
required to serve a particular customer involves the exercise of legislative discretion. For example, a potential customer may live a considerable distance from a utility's existing distribution system. Whether the
utility should be required to extend its lines to serve that customer may
involve questions of public policy such as the extent to which the capital costs of extending service should be paid by the customer who
desires service and the extent to which they should be paid by the remaining customers of the utility. Such public policy questions should be
decided by Public Service Commission, and a court may be encroaching upon legislative perrogatives when it attempts to determine the conditions upon which a customer is entitled to service.
E.

Billing Disputes Between Utilities and Customers

Ozarks involved a dispute between a privately owned utility and
one of its customers concerning the amount due the utility for utility
service. The principal constitutional constraints on the power of the
General Assembly to use an administrative agency to adjudicate controversies between two private parties are the right to trial by jury
guaranteed by article II, section 7, and the right to a remedy in the
courts guaranteed by article II, section 13. The right to a jury trial on
issues of fact probably applies to all actions for the recovery of
money. 6 6 It is doubtful that the General Assembly could empower the
Public Service Commission to adjudicate controversies in which the
remedy sought, whether by a customer or by a utility, was the recovery
of money. The customer in Ozarks was entitled to have his claim adjudicated in circuit court, not because the inquiry was exclusively judicial
265. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
266. See Waddell v. State, 235 Ark. 293, 357 S.W.2d 651 (1962) (right to a jury trial applied toa bastardy proceeding since the action was one for the recovery of money). See also ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 27-1704 (1979): "Issues of fact, arising in action by proceeding at law for the
recovery of money, or of specific real or personal property, shall be tried by a jury unless a jury
trial is waived."
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in character, but because only the circuit court could offer him the jury
trial guaranteed by the constitution. 67 The supreme court was correct
when it held in Ozarks that the circuit court was the only forum in
which the customer could litigate his claim, but it could have based
that holding on narrower grounds than separation of powers.
Determining the appropriate forum for resolving a billing dispute
is more problematical when there are no factual questions underlying
the dispute, and the only question to be resolved is the interpretation of
a Commission approved tariff. Neither the utility nor its customer is
entitled to have a jury interpret and apply Commission approved tariffs. The "right" to be served under a particular tariff is a Commission
created right, and when the right to a jury trial is inapplicable, separation of powers does not preclude the Commission from resolving a dispute between a utility and one of its customers concerning the interpretation of a Commission approved tariff or concerning which of several
Commission approved tariffs applied to the customer. This last statement is supported not only by the language of J.L. Williams & Son,
Inc. 68 but also by a recent supreme court decision.
In 1979 the Attorney General instituted an action before the Commission asserting that a utility had misinterpreted a Commission order
when it applied a fuel adjustment clause. The Commission agreed and
ordered the utility to refund nearly eight million dollars to its customers. In Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Arkansas Public Service Cornmission,269 which was issued shortly before its decision in Ozarks, the
supreme court affirmed the Commission's order. There is no suggestion
in the opinion that the Commission lacked the power to interpret and
apply its own rate order because such an inquiry was judicial in character. The Arkansas Power & Light Co. action was instituted on behalf
of all utility customers and involved the interpretation of a Commission
rate order rather than a Commission tariff, but these aspects of the
case are not significant for separation of powers purposes. If a single
customer instituted an action before the Commission asserting that a
utility had misinterpreted'a Commission approved tariff and seeking a
refund of amounts previously paid the utility, the separation of powers
doctrine should not preclude the Commission from resolving the
267. The fact that the customer in Ozarks joined an action for malicious prosecution with his
action to recover the $1,500 previously paid the utility strengthens the argument that the circuit
court was the appropriate forum. Clearly, the Public Service Commission could not have awarded
damages for malicious prosecution.
268. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
269. 275 Ark. 164, 628 S.W.2d 555 (1982).
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dispute. 70
The opinion in Ozarks implies that under no circumstances could
the Commission hear a dispute of the type involved in that case. This is
contrary to the court's conclusion in Thornbrough v. Williams.27 1 The
latter case teaches that an administrative agency can adjudicate a dispute between two private parties, even a common law action to which
the right to a jury trial applies, so long as either party can refuse to
accept the finding of the agency and institute an original action in
court. The Commission offers a relatively inexpensive, expeditious, and
expert forum for resolving billing disputes which both customers and
utilities may find preferable to the courts.27 2 Pursuant to the holding of
270. In Kansas City S. Ry. v. Tonn, 102 Ark. 20, 143 S.W. 577 (1912), a railroad contended
that the Interstate Commerce Commission had sole jurisdiction to determine whether the rate
charged an Arkansas shipper was reasonable. The supreme court held that the Arkansas courts
had jurisdiction to consider the action since they were determining which tariff applied to the
shipper, not whether the tariff was reasonable. The holding is not inconsistent with the argument
made in the text. It simply illustrates that the courts and the Arkansas Public Service Commission
may have concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes involving the interpretation and application of Commission approved tariffs to a particular customer.
Courts in other jurisdictions are split on whether a public utilities commission may adjudicate
disputes between a customer and a utility concerning the application of tariffs. North v. City of
Burlington-Elec. Light Dept., 125 Vt. 240, 214 A.2d 82 (1965), upheld the power. See also Delaware Coach Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of State of Del., 265 F. Supp. 648 (D. Del. 1967). The
Missouri Supreme Court treats the matter as a contract dispute between private parties that can
be resolved only by the courts. Wilshire Constr. Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 463 S.W.2d 903 (Mo.
1971). See also Katz Drug Co. v. Kansas City Power and Light Co., 303 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1957); May Department Stores Co. v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 341 Mo. 299, 107
S.W.2d 41 (1937).
271. 225 Ark. 709, 284 S.W.2d 641 (1955).
272. The current procedure for resolving billing disputes is set out in Rule 8(J) of the APSC
Rules. A customer who disputes his liability for utility service and who is unable to reach a satisfactory settlement with the utility may seek informal review of the matter by the complaints
section of the Commission. Rule 8(J)(2), APSC Rules. The complaints section contacts the utility
and conducts an informal investigation which may include an informal conference with the parties
or their representatives. Rule 8(J)(5), APSC Rules. The complaints section must issue a written
informal decision "affirming, modifying, or reversing the utility's resolution of the dispute" within
fourteen days of receipt of the response from the utility or within ten days of the date of an
informal conference, whichever is sooner. Rule 8(J)(6), APSC Rules. Either party may appeal the
informal decision to the Commission, which then conducts a full-blown hearing on the matter at
Commission expense. Rule 8(J)(9) and (10), APSC Rules. The Commission's decision is subject
to judicial review as provided by law. Rule 8(J)(10)(f), APSC Rules. The customer is not required to pay any filing fees in order to seek either informal or formal review of a billing dispute.
At both the informal conference before the complaints section or the formal hearing before the
Commission, the customer is entitled to representation by counsel or "another person" of his
choice. Rule 8(J)(5)(a) and (10)(a), APSC Rules.
When a customer disputes a threatened termination of utility service, termination is postponed
until "all investigations and hearings regarding the complaint are ended." Rule 8(J)(l 1), APSC
Rules. If service has already been terminated, the customer can obtain a hearing before the Commission within three days and a decision within one day after the hearing. Rule 8(J)(12), APSC
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Thornbrough v. Williams, the proceeding before the Commission
might be little more than a nonbinding arbitration, but doubtlessly
many customers and utilities would accept the findings of the Commission and not insist on relitigating the matter before a court. If it were
made clear, by statute or possibly by Commission rule, that submitting
a billing dispute to the Commission constituted a waiver of a party's
right to a jury trial, the way would be open to giving the Commission's
factual determinations some weight in a subsequent court proceeding.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The increased use in recent years of administrative agencies to discharge the functions of state and local government has at times
strained the tripartite separation of governmental powers incorporated
into the Arkansas Constitution. On the one hand, administrative agencies have been delegated powers that resemble judicial powers and that,
in many instances, could have been delegated to the courts. On the
other hand, the courts have been given the power to scrutinize agency
decisions more closely than is generally the case with other types of
legislative and executive action. If the spirit of a tripartite separation of
powers is to be preserved, the Arkansas Supreme Court should concentrate on developing appropriate standards of judicial review of administrative action.
In dealing with the problem of administrative agencies that exercise judicial powers, the supreme court should forego its efforts to develop workable definitions of judicial and legislative power. Many of
the powers currently being exercised by state and local government
cannot be neatly classified as either exclusively judicial, exclusively legislative, or exclusively executive in character. Clearly, there are certain
powers that, either through historical precedent or by virtue of express
constitutional language, are assigned exclusively to one department of
government, and no one would quarrel with strict enforcement of separation of powers when dealing with such powers. But the three departments of government are at best only power centers. As Professor Louis
Jaffe, who has written extensively on the subject of separation of powers and administrative agencies, has observed, the logic of separation of
powers is the "logic of polarity rather than strict classification." '73 As
Rules.
273. L. Jaffe, supra note I l, at 32. The same thought has been expressed by a number of
commentators on the subject of separation of powers:
Honest appraisal of the matter demonstrates that the doctrine of separation of powers
involves the broad division of powers among the legislature, the executive, and the judi-
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one moves outward from the three power centers, there is often no
sharp line demarcating the boundary between one department of government and another. Instead, there are "gray areas" in which some

blending of powers is inevitable. The Arkansas Supreme Court seems
to have accepted the blending of executive and legislative powers that
characterizes many administrative agencies." 4 It can likewise sanction

some blending of judicial and legislative powers without sacrificing the
basic purposes underlying the separation of powers doctrine. 75
Separation of powers was designed to allocate governmental powers among the three departments so that no one department became too
powerful at the expense of the other two. 78 This basic purpose is not
ciary, but with no expectation of complete separation. There is, in fact, a blending of
powers with no purity of any branch.
Ingram, The Executive, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 267, 273 (1967).
The fear of power concentrated in the hands of any single class or group has, among
other things, influenced the doctrine of separation of powers among the various organs
of government. It is not that there is always a clear-cut distinction between the functions of legislation and administration, between legislative, executive, and judicial 'powers.' Nor is it supposed that the functions of government can or should be distributed in
any perfectly systematic way to different organs.
Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separationof Powers," 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385,
385-86 (1935).
It has been concluded that governmental functions do not lend themselves to rigid classification as purely judicial or purely legislative, and that, even if they did, the three
branches of government are not so exclusive of each other so as to preclude a function
classified as judicial from being exercised by either of the other branches.
Force, supra note 63, at 97.
274. See Hickenbottom v. McCain, 207 Ark. 485, 181 S.W.2d 226 (1944).
275. It is only fair to note that the Arkansas Supreme Court has on at least one occasion
expressly rejected the argument that the practicalities of government necessitate some blending of
powers. In Oates v. Rogers, 201 Ark. 335, 144 S.W.2d 457 (1940), the court was asked to approve the following conclusion from the dissent in Springer v. Phillippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189,
209, 211 (1928):
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and
white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading
gradually from one extreme to the other. . . . It does not seem to need argument to
show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out
the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and
divide the branches into watertight compartments ...
The Arkansas Supreme Court stated that this conclusion regarding the implicit separation of powers at the federal level did not apply to the express separation of powers mandated by the Arkansas Constitution and that the Arkansas "system, providing as it does for distinct separation of
departments, did not in its inception contemplate a blending of authority." 201 Ark. at 346, 144
S.W.2d at 462.
276. The author with the most influence on the American doctrine of separation of powers
was probably Montesquieu. See Sharp, supra note 273, 390-91; Utton, Constitutional Limitations
on the Exercise of Judicial Functions by Administrative Agencies, 7 NAT. RESOURCES J. 599,
600-04 (1967). In commenting on Montesquieu's classic statement of the justification for separation of powers, Madison, who was one of the principal American exponents of the doctrine, stated:
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jeopardized when an administrative agency exercises powers lying in
the gray area between the judicial and legislative departments so long

as, to use the terminology of the United States Supreme Court, "the
essential attributes of judicial power" are retained by the courts,2 77 or,
to use the terminology of the Arkansas Supreme Court, "the actual

power of the judicial department is not diminished.

21

78

There is little

danger that administrative agencies will exercise the essential attributes of judicial power or diminish the actual power of the judicial department so long as the courts have the ultimate power to review and
control agency action. The courts must ultimately interpret and apply
any constitutional and statutory provisions limiting or otherwise affecting agency action. The courts must ultimately determine all questions
of law related to agency action, including the legal sufficiency of the
evidence supporting agency determinations of fact. The courts must act
as the ultimate guardians against arbitrary and capricious agency

action.

79

Focusing on judicial review of agency action is also critical when
dealing with the second type of separation of powers problem. Separation of powers serves the salutory purpose of preventing judicial entanglement in policy decisions that should be resolved by the political
processes of the legislative and executive departments. If the court is
concentrating on the problems of judicial review of agency action,
rather than attempting to develop definitions that neatly distinguish judicial power and legislative power, it less likely to be lulled into alFrom these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be inferred, that in
saying, "There can be no liberty, where the Legislative and Executive powers are united
in the same person, or body of magistrates;" or, "if the power of judging be not separated from the Legislative and Executive powers," he did not mean that these departments ought to have no partialagency in, or no control over the acts of each other. His
meaning, as his own words impart, and still more conclusively illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another
department, the fundamental principles of a free Constitution are subverted.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 314 (J. Madison) (Earle ed. 1937). The drafters of the Arkansas
separation of powers article were surely aware of the historical justification for separating governmental powers among the three departments of government.
277. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
278. The statement is a paraphrase of the "true construction" of the Arkansas separation of
powers provision as adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Oates v. Rogers, 201 Ark. 335,
144 S.W.2d 457 (1940). See supra note 224 and accompanying text for the court's actual
statement.
279. See Force, supra note 63, at 97-98. Cf. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Arkansas Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 267 Ark. 550, 593 S.W.2d 434 (1980).

354

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 7:279

lowing lower courts to decide questions involving the exercise of executive or legislative discretion.

